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ABSTRACT
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine how religiosity affects both public
attitudes about the importance of severe punishments (as a characteristic of democracy)
and public confidence in the police and the justice system. This study also examines the
socio-demographic (e.g., age, gender, education) factors that influence public perceptions
about punishment and confidence in criminal justice institutions. In doing so, this study
compares two countries that are both religious and democratic: Turkey and the United
States. The current study employs data from Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the World Values
Survey (WVS). The U.S. data is based on a sample of 1,249 respondents who participated
in face-to-face interviews in 2006. The Turkish data is based on a sample of 1,346
respondents who participated in face-to-face interviews in 2007. Analyses were
conducted using the SPSS 21 software program.
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INTRODUCTION
The focus of this study is on developing a better understanding of the relationship
between religiosity and public opinions about both punitiveness and confidence in the
police and the justice system. This study will compare results from Turkey to those of the
United States. The current study employs data from Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the World
Values Survey (WVS).
Culture consists of many elements and creates a unique society. These elements
are visible attributes of culture such as language, symbols, values, and social
organizations (Minkov, 2013). Because religion is one of the basic elements of culture, it
is a powerful social institution that influences individuals and societies. Religion affects
social behaviors, dominant values, and ideologies (Minkov, 2013). According to the Pew
Research Center (2012), worldwide, more than eight in ten people identify with a
religious group. Religious beliefs, practices, and prejudices are important because they
affect people’s feelings and attitudes. These effects may be seen in a variety of ways; for
instance, religion positively affects mental and physical health (Seybold and Hill, 2001),
religiosity decreases crime rates (Hull, 2000), religiosity influences penal practices and
shapes communities' punitive mentalities (Garland, 1990), religiosity influences
opposition to abortion (Unnever et al., 2010; Woodnam and Davidson, 1992) and it
affects whether or not people use drugs and have close friends who use drugs (Bahr et al.,
1

1998). It is reasonable to expect, then, that religiosity might also affect public perceptions
about the importance of severe punishment (as a characteristic of democracy) and public
confidence in the police and the justice system.
Even though beliefs about the purposes of punishment differ across cultures and
over time, societies have always punished those who violate their rules. Several studies
have examined the relationship between religiosity and punitiveness (Koster et al., 2009;
Grasmick et al., 1993; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004; Ulmer et al., 2008). These studies
have shown that religious people are more likely to support harsh punishments like
incarceration and the death penalty. In these studies, religious people are those who have
conservative views and tend to believe that people have the power to choose between
right and wrong. In other words, conservative people tend to believe that poverty, abuse,
addiction, racism, and/or a lack of opportunity may not be reasons to commit a crime
(Hardisty, 2004). Religious people think those who violate the law must pay the penalties
and need self-discipline, punishment, isolation, and religious redemption to correct their
behavior (Hardisty, 2004). Fundamentalist people who are not just religious
conservatives, but also take stand and fight for it (Marsden, 1991) commonly hold
retributive beliefs about punishment (Grasmick et al., 1993).
Religiosity also influences people’s political opinions and naturally leads them to
prefer conservative social outcomes and policies (Malka et al., 2012). It shapes how
people see the world based on traditional religious beliefs and teaching; and strongly
influences which party a person votes for (LaMothe, 2012). For instance, "love your
neighbor" is a religious goal and it may translate into political activism such as fighting
for the poor. Jacobs and Carmichael (2004) claim that political conservatism shapes the
2

frequency of sentences for severe punishments because political conservatism tends
people to believe that the poor and deprived are not predestined to criminality by their
situation; and that individuals have free will and freedom of choice regardless of their
particular personal circumstances. Thus, for political conservatives, the individual is
responsible for his or her criminal acts, and needs to punish.
Confidence in the government and in public institutions is important because it
affects the institutions' efficacy (Alesina & Ferrara, 2002) Confidence in any institution
shapes people’s willingness to support the institution. Trusting an institution means
having confidence that the institution is efficient, reliable, be able to achieve its duties,
and fair (Devos et. al., 2002). The police and the courts are two key institutions that work
cooperatively to enforce laws and regulations. Societies cannot survive without being
able to impose their rules (Tyler and Huo, 2002). The success of the police and the courts
depends on public confidence because when people trust these organizations, they are
more likely to support and cooperate with them. Evidence suggests that religiosity is
related to confidence in the police and the justice system (Guiso et al., 2003; Wisneski et
al., 2009; Garza, Rossi, & Zaclicever, 2009; Cao, Stack, & Sun, 1998). Specifically,
religious people trust legal authorities more so than do non-religious people (Guiso et al.,
2003). Garza, Rossi, and Zaclicever (2009) emphasize that religiosity is positively related
to trust in the police and in the judiciary. Also, Cao, Stack, and Sun (1998) found that
regular church attendants had more trust in the police in the United States.
To examine the relationship between religiosity and both public perceptions about
punishment and confidence in the police and the justice system, several main research
questions will be used:
3

1.

Are religious people more punitive than non-religious people in response
to crime?

2.

How do levels of punitiveness in the U.S. differ from those in Turkey?

3.

How are religiosity and confidence in the police and the justice system
related?

4.

How do levels of confidence in the police and the justice system in the
U.S. differ from those in Turkey?

The current study expects to find that people who are more religious are more
punitive in their response to crime than are less religious people because religious people
are more likely believe that criminal acts are the result of freely chosen and willful
behavior, rather than external circumstances and constraints. Also, in Turkey, overall
levels of punitiveness are likely to be higher than in the U.S. Because people are more
likely to desire conformity, social order, discipline, they look to legal institutions to
punish threats to collective security. Hard economic times, rapid social change, beliefs
about the loss of respect and discipline in society, concerns about social cohesion and
perceived social threat lead to a more punitive minded general public (Hardisty, 2004;
Tyler and Boeckann, 1997; King and Maruna, 2009).
This study also predicts that people who are more religious have more confidence
in the police and the justice system because religiosity reflects a generalized willingness
to trust authority, regardless of whether the authority is secular or religious. Belief in God
and a generally high level of trust in religion influence confidence in the authorities.
Stronger religiosity would be associated with greater trust in authorities (Wisneski et al.,
2009). Also, levels of confidence in these institutions are expected to be higher in Turkey
than in the U.S. Even when the police and courts were criticized by the West for their
violation of human rights, in Turkey they gained public support for their tough action
4

against minorities. This action was highly supported by the Turkish majority, most
notably by political elites (Cao and Burton, 2006).
This study will also consider how age, gender, and education affect public
perceptions about punishment and public confidence in the police and the justice system.
The current study expects to find that older people, men, and less educated people are
more punitive in their responses to crime. Older people, who are more vulnerable, may be
more fearful and thus more punitive than younger people, who are less vulnerable people
(Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986). Women are less punitive in their response to crime
because of greater concern for the well-being of others (Applegate, Cullen, and Fisher,
2002). Also, men are less likely women to feel empathy toward criminals and leads them
to prefer more severe punishments for criminal offenders (Unnever and Cullen, 2009).
Additionally, more educated people are less punitive in their attitudes toward criminal
punishment because education may help people to recognize the inequalities of the justice
system and external circumstances and determine that solutions to the crime problem may
be better served by policies of reintegration or rehabilitation (Applegate et al., 2000;
Grasmick et al., 1993; Dowler, 2003). This study also predicts that older people, women,
and less educated people have more confidence in the police and the justice system.
Older citizens tend to have more confidence in criminal justice system because they more
likely see the police as maintaining safety and order (Jesilow et al., 1995). Also, young
people view the police as exercising a restrictive role on their freedoms and therefore
may have negative views about the police (Reisig and Correia, 1997). Because men and
more educated people are more critical about criminal justice system, they may have less
confidence (Thompson and Lee, 2004).
5

Most studies examining the relationships among beliefs about punishment, levels
of confidence in criminal justice institutions, and religiosity have been conducted in
Europe and the United States. Furthermore, these studies generally have relied on data
from largely Christian populations. Thus, scholars have not compared countries that have
two different religious profiles. The current study fills this gap by using data from
Turkey, which is predominantly Muslim, and the United States, which is predominantly
Christian. In this respect, the U.S. and Turkey differ in regards to their religious
homogeneity. While the U.S. population is separated into many different religions and
religious affiliations, the Turkish population is more homogenous. This difference is
important because it affects public attitudes and opinions about more punitive criminal
sanctions and incarceration. Religious homogeneity influences formal and informal case
processing and sentencing norms (Ulmer et al., 2008).
Turkey is the best case to compare with the United States because they are both
very religious and democratic countries. In nondemocratic societies, examining public
perceptions about punishment may be difficult since policies about punishment would not
be affected by public perceptions. Policies may not be collective preferences of citizens
because in nondemocratic regimes policies are made by a person and/or a small group of
people, military, and one-party without whole public participation. Compared to the U.S.
and Turkey, levels of religiosity in other democratic countries are much lower. When
looking at other very religious countries especially Muslim countries, according to
Francis Fukuyama and others, the Islamic world has the fewest democracies and Turkey
is the Muslim world’s original and still most assertively secular state while remaining
devout members of Islamic faith (Fukuyama, 2001; Lewis, 1994; Costopoulos, 2005;
6

Terrill, 2013). In sum, comparing the U.S. and Turkey is beneficial because both are
religious and democratic nations, but they also differ in terms of their religious
homogeneity.

7

LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of the current study is to examine the effects of religiosity on both
public attitudes about the importance of severe punishment (as a characteristic of
democracy) and public confidence in the police and the justice system. The first part of
the literature review begins by describing the importance of public opinion. Next, it
presents a brief history of punishment and of the motives (i.e., purposes) of punishments.
It then describes the effects of religiosity on beliefs about punishment. The second part of
the literature review begins by describing the nature and importance of public confidence
in the police and the justice system. Next, the literature review describes the effects of
religiosity on confidence. The literature review concludes by discussing the role of
religiosity, public perception about punishment, and confidence in the police and the
justice system in both the United States and Turkey.
Why does public opinion matter?
At its most basic level, public opinion refers to citizens' collective preferences on
politics and government actions (Bianco and Canon, 2011). These opinions are
expressions of people’s feelings about specific subjects. Public opinion is often made
concrete through questions asked on polls. Politicians routinely cite public opinion polls
to justify their support of or opposition to public policies (Paletz, Owen, and Cook,
2012).
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Public opinion plays a number of important roles in a representative democracy.
Leaders get their legitimacy from citizens and they take public opinion into account when
making laws and formulating policy (Yavasgel, 1991). Opinion polls provide a
mechanism for briefly presenting the public's views to government leaders who are
making decisions that will affect society. Leaders often monitor the public pulse when
making policy decisions, especially when they face an election campaign (Paletz, Owen,
and Cook, 2012). In the United States, many governmental officials at both the national
and local levels have to take public opinion into account when deciding how to act
because voters elect them. These elected positions include sheriffs (except in New York),
some judges, and prosecutors (Ellis, 2012). Compared to the U.S., Turkish people have
less say in who runs their country at all levels because larger numbers of administrative
positions are appointed by senior administrators such as the Prime Minister, the
President, and the Ministry of Justice. These appointments include ambassadors, rectors
of universities, judges, and prosecutors (Aksel, 2013). Regardless of whether they are
elected or appointed, governmental officials must listen to public opinion if they wish to
keep their jobs because dissatisfied constituents can vote out those who ignore their
views or the regime could be in serious danger of revolution or collapse.
In particular, public opinions shape policies about punishments (Unnever &
Cullen, 2010). Although some studies claim that sentencing and correctional policies
should be determined by experts, others argue that public opinion must be considered in
democratic societies (Cullen et al., 2000). If policy makers do not consider public
opinion, a wide divergence may occur between the views of the public and the practices
of the justice system. This disagreement may damage the perceived legitimacy of and
9

people's confidence in criminal justice institutions, thereby undermining the
administration of justice.
People’s beliefs in the legitimacy of police and the courts affect their tendency
toward self-regulation, personal responsibility for following laws, acceptance of the
decisions of legal authorities, and voluntary deference to individual police officers and
judges (Tyler & Huo, 2002). Disenchanted or alienated members of the public are less
likely to report crimes to the police and less willing to participate in the criminal justice
process as witnesses or jurors (Roberts and Hough, 2005). Also, people who do not trust
the criminal justice system may try to provide their own justice (Roberts & Hough,
2002), known as vigilante justice. Vigilante justice involves pursuing your own justice,
without legal authority, because you think the legal agencies are inadequate (Oxford,
2015). In sum, then, public preferences play a crucial role in responses to crime.
Historical overview of beliefs about punishment
In general terms, punishment can be defined as a proper and reasonable response
to violations of social norms (Carlsmith et al., 2002). According to Kale (1995),
punishment is a sanction that persecutes people who defy a law or order. A basic aim of
punishment is to make criminals suffer. This suffering may include incarceration,
limitation of rights, pecuniary punishment, and/or execution.
Nearly everyone believes that criminal offenders deserve to be punished (Unnever
& Cullen, 2009). There are two common beliefs about why people should be punished
(Carlsmith et al., 2002). First, people who break society’s rules should be punished to
achieve justice and to restore social balance. The second purpose of punishment is to
reduce the risk of future crimes and to defend innocent people from being victimized.
10

Scholars have recognized five main purposes of punishment: (1) retribution - punishment
is justified because it is deserved and it fits the amount of harm; (2) deterrence - threat of
punishment discourages people from committing crime; (3) incapacitation - felons
cannot commit crimes while imprisoned; (4) rehabilitation - the treatment and reform of
offenders may include training, counseling, and drug treatment; and (5) restorative
justice - offenders take full responsibility for their wrongdoing and initiate restitution to
the victim, beginning the process of returning victims and the community to their
previous conditions (Stohr et al., 2013).
Across different cultures and times, the motives for punishments have changed.
Traditional societies were characterized by features such as lack of a written language,
limited production functions, an agricultural based economy, relative isolation, small
populations, relatively simple social institutions and technology, and a generally slow
rate of socio-cultural mobility (Rostow, 1960). In these societies, victims and/or their
families determined the form of punishment offenders received. Punishments were not
proportionate to the harm done. Capital punishment was a common response to several of
crimes including sexual assault. Generally, the purpose of these punishments was
retribution and deterrence (Kale, 1995). Crime was mostly attributed to the influence of
evil spirits. Punishments for treason, witchcraft, sacrilege, and incest or other sex
offenses were severe in primitive societies. The whole group, sometimes including
neighboring clans, turned out to punish the offenders (Barnes and Teeters, 1959; Stearns,
1936).
Similar features were continued in more developed ancient civilizations such as
Hebrews, Egyptians, and Babylonians (Stearns, 1936). Ancient people believed that law
11

had been given to them by God. Therefore, in their view, if a person broke a law, he or
she was also disobeying God and if a person disobeyed God, the whole city might get
punished with a flood or storm. Punishing criminals was done to make sure God did not
become offended or angry (Kale, 1995). In addition to execution, punishments included
torture, whipping, branding, mutilation, drowning, suffocation, and banishment (Stohr et
al., 2013). People attempted to equalize crime and punishment with the rule of “an eye
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,” meaning that criminals were punished by having an
equally painful thing done to them that they did to their victims (Stearns, 1936; Stohr et
al., 2013).
During the Middle Ages, religious reasons for punishment increased (Stearns,
1936). This occurred because religion was the source of the law. An offense against
society was also an offense against God. The criminal justice system was in many ways
another arm of religious orthodoxy. Crimes were sins, and sinners were to be punished
(Friedman, 1993). Punishment was often barbaric; whipping was an extremely common
punishment especially for servants and slaves (Friedman, 1993; Stohr et al, 2013). Public
execution and corporal punishment were common, and torture was part of most criminal
investigations. Punishment was ceremonial and directed at the prisoner’s body. It was a
ritual in which the audience was important (Foucault, 1977). The primary motive of
punishment was deterrence. The sinner or offender was punished as an example so that
others would not do likewise (Stearns, 1936).
There were significant changes at the end of the 18th century. In addition to
economic, cultural, and social developments, beliefs about human rights and the growth
of new philosophies arose. These new philosophies included classicism, or the penal law
12

movement which focused on legality, equality of all men, equal treatment under the law,
and prohibition of cruel punishments (Canals, 1960) and humanism, which focused on a
range of ideas such as human freedom, critical thinking, the autonomy of the human
subject, the dignity of the person (Rusen and Laass, 2009). Philosophers such as Voltaire,
Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, and Cesare Beccaria fueled social change with their
belief in human potential, free will, and the inmate goodness of man. Their thoughts
reformed European countries. Old punishment systems were deemed barbaric. The
practice of cruel punishment and arbitrary legal codes began to wane. Reformers were not
agreeing to any more whippings, torture, and the like. Also, prison sentences became
standardized (Friedman, 1993; Lyons, 2003; Stohr et al, 2013; Foucault, 1977). Foucault
(1977) explained the shifting from public execution to prison rules. The exhibition of
prisoners and the public execution ended and publicity moved from the trial and the
sentence. The end of the public idea of punishment was the change from body to soul
because imprisoned people can be controlled by sciences directed at the soul, such as
psychiatry. When a criminal was condemned to be executed, the judge alone passes the
sentence. When he was sent to prison, he was also evaluated by doctors and psychiatrists.
Therefore, offenses became objects of scientific knowledge. Psychiatrists now decide on
a criminal's medico-legal treatment. The penalty now addressed the soul. Upon the idea
of the "soul", concepts of the psyche, personality, and consciousness were created, as
well as scientific techniques and claims. There were limits to how you can punish the
body, as the execution at the beginning demonstrates, but the soul allows new
possibilities; instead corporal punishment and/or killing criminals, punishment became
possible to supervise and investigate them (Foucault, 1977).
13

In modern communities, the primary punishment motives began to change as
rehabilitation and restorative justice rather than retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation.
However, severe punishments are still supported and many countries have inhumane
prisons, use the electric chair, and continue to use torture (Kale, 1995). People continue
to believe that punishment is the most effective deterrent of crime (Carlsmith et al.,
2002). They also believe that current punishments are too lenient and should be tougher
(Roberts & Hough, 2002-2005).
Effects of religiosity on punishment
Religion is one of the most effective institutions at shaping opinions about
punishment (Applegate et al., 2000; Murphy, 2003). All major world religions regulate
lifestyles and have religious laws. Although all of them mention the importance of
forgiveness, they also have sanctions for punishment (Moses, 2007).
Grasmick and McGill (1994) evaluated the relationship between religious
convictions and public punitiveness in the United States. They found that Christian
fundamentalism strongly predicted individual support for the use of corporal punishment
and punitive criminal justice policies. The study concluded that people who are highly
religious seem to hold people more accountable for their actions and therefore deserving
of punishment. Conservative Christians believe that crime is a result of the offender’s
character, rather than unfortunate or unjust environmental influences (Grasmick &
McGill, 1994).
Koster et al. (2009) investigated the relationship between religiosity and attitudes
toward victimless crimes such as tax evasion and fare-dodging in the public
transportation system. Law prohibits these types of crimes, but people may think they are
14

justifiable because social norms may differ from legal norms. According to their research,
religious beliefs guide social norms and therefore people’s behavior. Members of
religious organizations have shared beliefs about which desired behavior is rewarded and
which undesired behavior is punished. Koster et al. (2009) compared the effects of
religion across 70 countries by using data from the World Values Survey (WVS). In this
study, religious affiliations were examined in four categories: none, Christian, Islamic,
and other. Results showed that people who have a religious affiliation judged victimless
crimes to be less justifiable than people who do not belong to an organized religion. In
addition, Koster et al. claimed that members of a religion group would condemn
victimless crimes more strongly than those who do not have a religious affiliation. A
religious affiliation and a higher level of religiosity both result in a stronger
condemnation of victimless crimes such as tax evasion.
Grasmick et al. (1993) examined the link between support for the retributive
justice and fundamentalist religious beliefs. According to their research, Fundamentalist
Protestant churches are a powerful force in public policy debates, not only at the national
level, but also at state and local levels. Fundamentalist Protestants are more punitive than
liberal/moderate Protestants about criminal justice policies because fundamentalist
religious people believe that crime results from characteristic of offenders rather than
their situations (e.g., poverty). Jacobs and Carmichael (2004) also considered
conservative churches’ attitudes toward criminals. There are more death sentences in
states that have large number of members in conservative churches. Jacobs and
Carmichael claimed that areas with more fundamentalist conservatives may have
increased public support for harsh punishments like the death penalty because strong
15

fundamentalist values may increase the probability that prosecutors ask for severe
punishments and that judges and juries support these requests. According to Jacobs and
Carmichael (2004), public religiosity shapes the frequency of using severe criminal
sentences (Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004).
Ulmer et al. (2008) examined the relationship between religious context and
sentencing severity in Pennsylvania county courts. When residents in an area share the
same religion, the place is characterized by a religious homogeneity. Their research
claimed that religious homogeneity influences formal and informal case processing and
sentencing norms. Specifically, Christian homogeneity likely represents the shared
cultural and political influence of local Christian communities on local justice.
Homogeneous Christian communities favor more punitive criminal sanctions and
incarceration. More homogeneously Christian counties are tougher on offenders overall
and there may be less tolerance for repeat wrongdoing. Even though Ulmer et al., (2008)
examined only Christian homogeneity, it relates to the current study. While the U.S.
population is separated into more different religions and religious affiliations, the Turkish
population is more homogenous. According to Pew Research Center, in 2007 78% of
Americans were Christian (51.3% of those Americans were Protestant, 23.9% were
Catholic, and 0.6% were Orthodox). As reported by the Central Intelligence Agency in
2005, 99% of Turkish people were Muslim (78% of those Muslims were Sunni and 21%
were Shia). These figures illustrate how Turkey is religiously more homogenous than the
U.S.
Religiosity influences people’s political opinions and naturally leads them to
prefer conservative social outcomes and policies (Malka et al., 2012). According to
16

Jacobs and Carmichael (2004), public conservatism shapes the frequency of severe
sentences. Jacobs and Carmichael (2004) emphasized that in contrast to liberals,
conservatives attributed crime not to environmental conditions, but to criminals freely
choosing to commit it. While liberals encourage rehabilitation to reduce violent
offending, conservatives support deterrence to reduce crime. Conservatives stand behind
the assertion that a few executions will protect many innocent victims from brutal crimes.
Moreover, people often want a simple and quick solution to the complex problem of
crime (Roberts and Hough, 2005). They do not believe that rehabilitation may change an
offender’s criminal behaviors because these behaviors results from offenders'
characteristics rather than from their limited opportunities such as lack of housing, low
wages, and poor education (Roberts and Hough, 2005). Maruna and King (2009) support
that those who believe criminal acts are the result of freely chosen and willful behavior
are more likely to be punitive than those who feel crime is the result of external
circumstances and constraints.
Other important studies have explored the relationship between religiosity and
support for corporal punishment which involves spanking or a slap to shape children's
inappropriate behavior. Several empirical studies have linked religious fundamentalism
or conservatism with greater use of corporal punishment (Gith, 2014; Ellison et al. 1996;
Ellison and Sherkat, 1993; Ellison and Bradshaw, 2008). These studies indicate that even
though corporal punishments produce physical harm, conservative Christian and Muslim
parents commonly use it. In general, evidence suggests that conservative parents use
corporal punishment more often than parents who have less conservative beliefs. More
specifically, according to Ellison and Sherkat (1993) conservative protestant parents
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endorse punitive punishments because they use biblical principles as a guide for authority
relations with children. Generally, they believe that all humans are born sinful, and
corporal punishment is necessary for saving children from sins such as selfishness.
Relatedly, Ellison and Bradshaw (2008) found that conservative religious beliefs and
sociopolitical ideology are positively related to approval of corporal punishment among
the U.S. public. Specifically, persons who identify themselves as politically conservative
are more prone to support corporal punishment than are their more moderate and liberal
counterparts. Additionally, Gith (2014) claimed that corporal punishment is permitted by
Islamic law for children who do not fulfill their religious obligations or who show signs
of unacceptable traits or behavior. Conservative Muslim parents commonly use corporal
punishment and they think it is an effective disciplinary measure.
In contrast to previous studies, Unnever and Cullen (2009) claimed that religious
beliefs may also increase people’s empathy for criminals rather than their punitiveness.
Empathy is associated with believing offenders are regretful and giving them a second
chance. Consequently, religious beliefs may generate more support for rehabilitation as
opposed to a punitive punishment. Unnever et al. (2005) also claimed that people who are
more forgiving, more compassionate, and have a close personal relationship with a loving
God are less likely to support punitive crime control policies. In a related study,
Applegate et al. (2000) examined the effects of compassionate religious beliefs (i.e.,
forgiveness) on correctional attitudes. Their research supported that those respondents
who were more forgiving were more supportive of offenders' treatment and were less
punitive. Applegate et al. also asserted that belief in forgiveness as well as conservative
religious beliefs may shape how Americans think about crime.
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Apart from the effects of religion and politics on punishment, researchers have
also examined factors such as age, education, and gender. For instance, Langworthy and
Whitehead (1986) examined people’s attitudes towards punishment according to their
membership in particular socio-demographic categories. Their research pointed out that
older people, who are more vulnerable, may be more fearful and thus more punitive than
younger people, who are less vulnerable. War and Ellison (2000) found that because
older people tend to have more empathy toward crime victims than toward offenders,
they are more punitive than are younger people (Warr and Ellison, 2000). Older people
are also more likely to have children; fear of criminal victimization for their children may
make them less empathetic toward criminal offenders.
Langworthy and Whitehead (1986) also investigated the role of gender in
attitudes towards punishment. They expected to find that women are more fearful and
thus more punitive than men; however, their research found that men, not women, were
more punitive. Applegate, Cullen, and Fisher (2002) explained that women are less
punitive in their response to crime because of their greater concern for the well-being of
others. Also, Unnever and Cullen (2009) suggested that the compassionate personality of
women may make it easier to empathetically identify with criminals, leading them to
prefer more lenient punishments for criminal offenders. Sanders and Hamilton (1987)
found no gender differences in punishment norms, while Gault (1997) discovered that
men were more likely than women to support punitive political policies.
Evidence suggests that education is the strongest predictor of punitiveness, with
more highly educated people being less punitive (Gelb, 2011). According to Dowler
(2003), one reason that people who have a college education are more likely to hold non19

punitive attitudes may be that education helps people recognize the inequalities of the
justice system and determine that solutions to the "crime problem" may be better served
by policies of reintegration or rehabilitation (Applegate et al., 2000; Grasmick et al.,
1993; Dowler, 2003).
In sum, numerous studies have shown that more religious people tend to support
more severe punishments than less religious people in their response to crime (Ellison,
1991; Grasmick et al., 1993; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004; Grasmick and McGill, 1994).
Studies show that those who support fundamentalist or/and conservative attitudes
commonly hold retributive beliefs about punishment. Also, to understand perceptions
about punishment, age, gender, and education are commonly used as control variables.
Most studies find that older people, men, and less educated people are more punitive in
their responses to crime (Warr and Ellison, 2000; Applegate et al., 2000; Grasmick et al.,
1993; Dowler, 2003; Ellison, 1991; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004; Grasmick and McGill,
1994).
Confidence in the police and in the justice system
Confidence in an institution requires that people believe in and support the
institution. Trusting an institution entails having confidence that the institution is
efficient, reliable, able to achieve its duties, and fair (Devos et. al., 2002). All societies
create organizations and authorities whose purpose is to maintain social order. Two key
institutions, the police and the courts, work cooperatively to create and enforce laws and
regulations that shape public conduct in socially desirable ways. Societies cannot survive
without being able to enforce their rules (Tyler and Huo, 2002).
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Confidence is a conviction that the justice system performs successfully and
reasonably and that it represents the concerns and principles of the society. Fairness is
essential for all confidence relations, including the public’s relations with the police and
the justice system. Fairness focuses on public ideas about whether services are distributed
equally to all groups or whether the public is receiving what it deserves (Bradford et. al.,
2008). Confidence not only affects an individual organization, but also influences society
as a whole. According to Alesina and Ferrara (2002), when people trust organizations,
they function better and governments are more efficient. Therefore, more trust brings
more success in a country because it shapes people’s responses to the law and the
legitimacy of legal authorities (Tyler & Huo, 2002).
Trust shapes public willingness to obey legal authorities and this willingness is
sign of the legitimacy of authorities (Tyler & Huo, 2002). Legitimacy is a belief that
affects people’s motivation to cooperate with, and defer to, legal authorities. Confidence
and legitimacy are essential, especially with respect to the police and the justice system,
because they promote support and cooperation (Hohl et al., 2010). When legitimacy is
weakened, legal authorities, individuals, commodities, and societies are damaged
(Jesilow et. al., 1995). People’s beliefs in the legitimacy of police and the courts affect
their tendency toward self-regulation, their personal responsibility for following laws,
accepting the decisions of legal authorities, and their willingness to defer voluntarily to
individual police officers and judges (Tyler & Huo, 2002).
The functions of the police and the justice systems shape the quality of life in a
city or a country. If these systems work better, people live in serenity (Salvatore et. al.,
2013). Police officers and court officials are the “face” of the criminal justice system.
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However, public attitudes toward the criminal justice system have focused primarily on
police officers because they are citizens’ most frequent (and sometimes only) contact
with the legal system. That is, they are the most visible representatives and they represent
prototypical authorities (Bradford et. al., 2008; Jesilow et. al., 1995). Moreover, police
are the system’s primary agents to detect and solve crimes and to help people (Jesilow et.
al., 1995).
Building trust for any organization is essential, but it is critical to the fight against
crime. According to Tilly (1985), a government’s legitimacy comes from its power and
force. The government uses this power and force to achieve its responsibility for
protecting citizens from threats. Tilly claimed that before the establishment of the modern
state, the state’s use of power was not legitimate. The state offered protection to its
citizens like a mafia groups that created a threat themselves and then provide protection
from that threat. Similarly, to monopolize the power, the states create a threat, but there is
no enemy except the states. He gave the example of piracy and Robin Hood and analyzed
how the modern state evolved in a way to possess permanent, professional military and
police forces that could regulate the state’s rules and monopolize power. He defined the
sale of the protection by the state as the “forced sale of protection” and showed how
citizens have no choice but to accept the state’s authority.
Trust and confidence are at the heart of policing in the modern world. Members of
the community need to trust their police officers and be confident that they will be
respected and treated fairly. The other side of the concern is that the police need to gain
the trust and confidence of all members of the community (Kabukcu, 2006). Confidence
in the police system is an indicator of public satisfaction because the public is the
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consumer of police services (Cao, Stack, & Sun, 1998). The more positive people’s
perceptions are about the legitimacy of the police, the more confidence they have in
them. Increased confidence in the police also increases citizens’ cooperation with the
police and their willingness to obey the law (Kirmizidag, 2015). In contrast, decreased
confidence in the police may result in a reluctance to report crimes. When public
confidence in the police is low, citizens may not report crimes or call for services and
assistance (Jang et. al., 2010). Without community support and information, the police
cannot fulfill their obligations (Cao and Burton, 2006).
Individuals from different societies with various cultures, religions, and political
backgrounds may develop different attitudes toward legal authorities (Jang, Joo, & Zhao,
2010). There are several studies that have examined the factors associated with
confidence across different countries. Newton and Norris (1999) examined the
relationship between social trust and institutional confidence. They used the World Value
Survey to compare public support for some institutions, such as parliament, civil services,
the legal system, the police, and the army, in 17 nations including Spain, France, Canada,
the United States, and Denmark. Their research showed that confidence is not affected by
social attitudes or behavior. Instead, the performance of governments and their political
characteristics define citizens’ confidence in the police and other institutions. In countries
like Norway, Denmark, and Canada, high social trust is accompanied by considerable
public confidence in the police. In contrast, countries like France, Belgium, and Italy
display the opposite tendency, with suspicion of other citizens going hand-in-hand with
minimal confidence in the police. Most countries, such as Japan, the Netherlands, and
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Britain, are predictably scattered along the middle of the diagonal. Similar patterns are
found for confidence in the legal system (Newton & Norris, 1999).
Kaariainen (2007) discussed public trust towards the police in European
countries. The quality and structure of the system of government indeed affected the
degree of citizens’ trust in the police. In particular, the level of corruption in the
government clearly decreased trust in the police and probably in other public service
institutions as well.
Apart from the level of corruption and the performance of governments and their
political characteristics, there are several studies suggesting that religiosity affects public
confidence in the police and the justice system.
Effects of religiosity on confidence
Evidence suggests that religiosity affects both people's behavior and their beliefs
about various social issues. Even though the effects of religiosity have been examined in
many different fields, there are few theoretical explanations available about its effect on
public confidence in legal authorities because religiosity is usually used as a control
variable. According to Guiso and colleagues (2003), religious people trust others, the
government, and the legal system more than do non-religious people. Moreover, they
tend to be less willing to break the laws because religious people are more likely to
follow rules mandated by authority and tend to be less critical toward authorities
(Okumus, 2005).
Religious people may be more likely to cooperate with legal authorities by, for
example, reporting a crime to the police (Becker & Dhingra, 2001). One reason for this
may be because religious associations serve as an important platform for social
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connection. Voluntary associations such as religious groups bring people together to
work on local problems (producing social order) and guide people to cooperate with
police and the courts (Newton & Norris, 1999). Wisneski et al. (2009) also confirm that
religiosity reflects a generalized willingness to trust authority, regardless of whether the
authority is secular or religious. Belief in God and a generally high level of trust in
religion influence trust in the authorities. Stronger religiosity would be associated with
greater trust in authorities. Their research also showed that people with higher religiosity
are more likely to trust the justice system.
Garza, Rossi, and Zaclicever (2009) conducted another important study about the
relationship between religiosity and confidence. Their study examined the link between
subjects’ religiosity and trust in five key institutions: the government, the police, the
armed forces, the judiciary, and banks in Latin America. The study’s result showed that
individual religiosity is positively correlated with trust in institutions. There is a positive
relationship between religious practice and trust in the government, the police, and the
judiciary.
Several studies have examined the relationship between confidence in the police
and religiosity. For example, Cao and Zhao (2005) compared levels of confidence in the
police in nine Latin American nations to that of the United States. According to their
study, confidence in the police was positively related to one’s religiosity in Latin
America, but a similar relationship was not found in the United States. Cao and Zhao
attributed this difference to church attendance, which is higher in Latin America.
Religious diversity in the U.S. may decrease church attendance.
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The relationship between religiosity and confidence in criminal justice institutions
also differs by age, gender, and level of education. The older people are, the higher their
confidence in the police since they more likely see criminal justice institutions as
maintaining safety and order (Cao, Stack, & Sun, 1998; Jang et al. 2010; Jesilow et al.,
1995). The young may have less confidence in authorities because they think legal
authorities and rules restrict their freedoms and therefore they are inclined to possess
negative views (Reisig and Correia, 1997). In addition to young people, men and more
educated people have less confidence because they are more critical of the criminal
justice system (Thompson and Lee, 2004; Jang et al. 2010). Cao and Zhao (2005)
claimed that education makes people value freedom more, thereby decreasing their
confidence in the police because they represent the long arm of the government and
because they represent the oppressive part of a democratic government.
The U.S. context
Religiosity and punitiveness in the U.S.
The United States is one of the best cases to analyze the effects of religiosity on
public perception about punishment and confidence in criminal justice institutions
because the U.S. differs from other developed democratic countries in its level of
religiosity. Although there is significant religious diversity in the United States, more
than 80 percent of Americans identify themselves as Christian (ARDA, 2014). Crabtree
and Pelham (2009) examined levels of religiosity using Gallup Poll data from 143
countries and territories for the years 2006, 2007, and 2008. Across all populations, the
median proportion of residents who said religion was important in their daily lives was
82%. Americans fell well below that midpoint, at 65%. A population's religiosity level is
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strongly related to its average standard of living. Social scientists have stated that
Americans’ high level of religiosity is relative to other rich-world populations. Among 27
countries generally seen as part of the developed world, the median proportion of those
who say religion is important in their lives is just 38%. From this point of view, the fact
that two-thirds of Americans respond this way makes them look extremely devout
(Crabtree & Pelham, 2009). The Pew Global Attitudes Project (2002) confirmed this
finding that religion is more significant for Americans than for people in other prosperous
countries. Almost sixty percent of Americans mention religion as being very important in
their lives. This is approximately two times higher than in Canada (30%) and much
higher than in Japan (12%), Italy (27%), Germany (21%), and France (11%). Levels of
religiosity in the U.S. are closer to developing countries than to developed countries like
Turkey (65%). This is an important difference to consider when examining the effects of
religiosity on public perceptions about punishment and confidence in the police and the
justice system in the U.S.
In the U.S., religion was also influential in the development of the criminal justice
system. The first settlers to America brought with them the English system of common
law. Many colonial crime codes were defined in biblical terms. Over the years,
Americans have developed mechanisms that institute and enforce rules of society as well
as assign responsibility and punish offenders (Hartzell, 2015).
Simon (2007) described the history of public perceptions about punishment in
America. In the 1960s, people were more supportive of rehabilitating offenders because
they attributed crime to social problems such as poverty and lack of education. However,
they now think offenders do not deserve rehabilitation; instead, they think offenders
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should be removed from the community by being imprisoned. Americans’ punitiveness
has grown dramatically since 1960. More and more people are excluded from community
life through incarceration and other sanctions. A higher percentage of the population is
involved in the criminal justice system in the United States than in any other developed
country (Ghandoosh, 2014). The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the
world (Nagin et al., 2009; Kugler et al., 2013), and this rate is five times higher than other
countries (Tsai & Scommegna, 2012). Also, one out of every nine prisoners is serving a
life sentence (Ghandoosh, 2014). Furthermore, the U.S. continues to use the death
penalty even though almost all Western democracies have banned it (Kugler et al., 2013).
Kugler et al. (2013) investigated differences in punitive attitudes between
Americans and Germans. They found that Americans adopt longer sentences, support
retribution, and are less supportive of rehabilitation. For both minor and major crimes,
Americans impose more severe sentences than Germans. For instance, Germans assigned
a sentence of 30 years for murder, whereas Americans assigned life sentences. For armed
robbery, Germans assigned a sentence of over 6 months and Americans assign a sentence
of over one year (Kugler et al., 2013). Wilson and Petersilia (2010) also compared the
crime and criminal justice policies of different nations. According to their research, the
United States is more punitive than other industrialized countries. The United States has
higher levels of serious violence than other developed nations, but similar levels of minor
violence and property crime. Moreover, the U.S. is more punitive than other countries
toward less severe offenses like property crimes and drug offenses.
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Confidence in criminal justice institutions in the U.S.
Several studies have examined the public's satisfaction, trust, and confidence in
legal authorities in the U.S. In general, they have found that when the authority is neutral
and unbiased, respectful, and fair, there is a high level of public confidence, cooperation,
and willingness to participate. Although Americans value freedom and individualism, and
are deeply suspicious about state power, they have higher confidence in legal authorities
than do other Western countries. Furthermore, although American police are often tainted
by new scandals, empirical studies have shown that Americans generally hold positive
attitudes toward legal authorities, especially the police (Cao, 2001).
According to the most recent Gallup poll (2015), more than half of Americans
remain confident in the police. Even though levels of confidence in the police are lower
compared to previous years, the police are still one of the institutions ranking highest in
confidence. Overall, 25% of Americans say they have a great deal of confidence in the
police, 27% report having quite a lot of confidence, 30% have some confidence, 16%
have very little confidence, and only 2% have no confidence. Americans are also
confident in newspapers (24%), the presidency (33%), the church or organized religion
(42%), and the medical system (37%).
Several studies state that confidence levels in the U.S. are higher than some other
nations. For instance, Cao and Huo (2001) compared public confidence levels in the
police in China and in the United States. The study maintained that the public in the U.S.
has greater confidence in the police than do their Chinese counterparts. According to Cao
and Huo, low levels of public confidence in the police in China may well be an extension
of the low level of public confidence in the regime in general. In addition, Cao, Stack,
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and Sun (1998) compared confidence levels in Japan and the U.S. The findings showed
that the Japanese actually have less confidence in their police than do Americans.
Americans generally have high levels of confidence in the police, but this confidence was
not equally distributed among citizens and often varied across larger social aggregations.
Specifically, the African Americans less likely have confidence in police (Jang, Joo, &
Zhao, 2010).
The Turkish context
There are some important differences between the U.S. and Turkey, like their
religious homogeneity. While the U.S. population is separated into many different
religions and religious affiliations, the Turkish population is more homogenous.
According to Pew Research Center, in 2007 78% of Americans were Christian; 51.3% of
those were Protestant, 23.9% were Catholic, and 0.6% were Orthodox. As reported by the
Central Intelligence Agency in 2005, 99% of Turkish people were Muslim; 78% of those
were Sunni and 21% were Shia. These percentages illustrate how Turkey is religiously
more homogenous than the U.S.
Turkey and the U.S. also differ in regard of their crime rates. European Institute
for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations published
international comparison of crime statistics. This comparisons were based on police
recorded cases in 2006 and based on six of the most serious crimes: intentional homicide,
rape, robbery, assault, causing serious bodily harm, burglary, and vehicle theft.
According to results, intentional homicide 5.0 in the U.S. and 3.3 in Turkey; rape 28.6 in
the U.S. and 1.5 in Turkey; robbery 133 in the U.S. and 11 in Turkey; assault 262 in the
U.S. and 218 in Turkey; burglary 715 in the U.S. and 161 in Turkey; and vehicle theft
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258 in the U.S. and 25 in Turkey for per 100,000 population (Cowen, 2010). Therefore, it
may be said that police recorded crime rate is somewhat higher in the U.S. than in
Turkey.
On the other hand, the two countries are similar in that they are both democratic
and religious nations and therefore comparing the U.S. and Turkey would be beneficial.
The Turkish context is unique because most studies in criminology have been conducted
in Europe and the United States. Furthermore, most studies have relied on data from
largely Christian populations and therefore analyzing a Muslim population helps address
this limitation.
According to Fukuyama (2001) and others, the Islamic world has the fewest
democracies and Turkey is the Muslim world’s original and still most assertive secular
state, although it has devout members of Islamic faith (Fukuyama, 2001; Lewis, 1994;
Costopoulos, 2005; Terrill, 2013). Fukuyama claimed that a liberal democracy and free
markets require certain values to work in societies and these values' origins may not be
entirely rational. It is not an accident that modern liberal democracy emerged first in the
Christian West, and then in regions such as East Asia, Latin America, Orthodox Europe,
South Asia, and Africa. However, the fundamentalist versions of Islam that have
dominated in recent years make Muslim societies particularly resistant to modernity. Of
all contemporary cultural systems, the Islamic world has the fewest democracies and only
Turkey alone qualifies (Fukuyama, 2001).
According to Lewis (1994), in Turkey democracy is limited and formal and may
not contain completely democratic features such as respect for civic, human, and minority
rights. However, it is the only Muslim democracy that can be measured and defined.
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Also, it offers the best chance for securing and maintaining those other rights that are an
essential part of a free society. Lewis (1994) listed three major reasons to explain the
relative success of democracy in Turkey. First, Turkey was never colonized and was
never subject to imperial rule or domination, as were almost all the Islamic lands of Asia
and Africa. And democratic institutions were neither imposed by the victors, as happened
in the defeated Axis countries, nor bequeathed by departing imperialists, as happened in
the former British and French dependencies, but were introduced by the free choice of the
Turks themselves. Second, Turkey, of all the Muslim countries, has had the longest and
closest contact with the West, dating back almost to the beginnings of the Ottoman state,
and made a deliberate choice for westernization and for a Westward political orientation.
Third, Turkey is the only Muslim country that, has achieved significant economic growth
and a substantial rise in the standard of living, and this by its own efforts, not by some
fortunate accident, such as the presence of oil in the subsoil. Turkish economic growth
was not due to resources discovered by others and used by others for purposes invented
by others. It was due to the emergence of new attitudes to economic activity, of new
policies for economic development, and of new social elements able to put these policies
into effect.
The road to democracy has not been easy in Turkey. Secularism was the main aim
of founders of the Republic of Turkey. They wanted to transform Turkey into a modern,
secular, and Western-style state (Akbaba and Morrison, 2012). A series of radical, social,
and political reforms were instituted such as the abolition of the caliphate (i.e., a form of
Islamic government led by a leader of the entire Muslim community and believed to be
the successor to the Prophet Mohammed), the banning of religious clothing, and the
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obliteration of Sharia (i.e., Islamic legal system) courts. The goal was to eliminate
religion from the public sphere and simply relegate it to the private sphere (Akbaba and
Morrison, 2012). Religious discourse had been strictly controlled by multiple
mechanisms. For instance the Ministry of Religious Affairs was established to regulate,
control, and oversee all religious activity in the country. This entity was, and still is,
responsible for the administration and organization of religious institutions, as well as for
providing religious education in schools (Akbaba and Morrison, 2012). Also, the military
was another powerful control mechanism over religion. In addition to protecting the
territorial integrity of the country, the military was responsible for the preservation of the
unitary and secular character of the country. Three military interventions happened in
1960, 1971, and 1980. Also, in 1995 an Islamic party won the election and then Islam
became more visible in public life. After two years, the military forced the president of
this political party to resign (Akbaba and Morrison, 2012). According to Akbaba and
Morrison (2012), these military interventions interrupted democratic processes and led to
polarization of the political system in Turkey.
Religiosity and punitiveness in Turkey
Even though Turkey has tried to create a strong tradition of secularism, it is still a
religious nation. According to Pew Research Center (2002), 65% of people say religion is
important in their lives. This figure is much higher than European countries such as Great
Britain (33%), Germany (21%), Russia (14%), Bulgaria (13), and France (11%) some
Asian countries such as Korea (25%), Japan (12%). Also, the International Social Survey
Program (ISSP) conducted a study that compared religious attitudes. There are 45
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members of ISSP and Turkey is one of them. The research found that 95% of people in
Turkey believe in God (Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2009).
Muslims make up more than 90 percent of the population in Turkey (PRC, 2013).
Muslims’ holy book is the Quran and the ethical principles set down in Islam’s holy book
are known as Sharia (PRC, 2013). Islamic Law (sharia) offers moral and legal guidance
for nearly all aspects of Muslims’ life, from marriage and divorce to inheritance and
contracts and criminal punishments.
According to Islamic criminal procedure, to commit a crime is a sin and
retaliation is mandatory because crimes affect God’s rules that defend higher values and
welfare. The Quran prescribes these rules and believers’ lives should be based upon them
(Halemm et al. 2003). According to followers of Islam, punishment is essential to correct
a crime. It seeks to prevent crime before its occurrence and is a warning against its
repetition. It therefore has both a preventive and a curative role. Sinful criminals damage
the community as a whole and punishments benefit the whole of the community
(Halemm et al. 2003).
The concerned authorities determine the type and degree of punishment needed to
implement justice, so different punishments may be awarded for one crime, depending on
the different circumstances surrounding the crime and the criminal (Halemm et al. 2003).
For some crimes, however, punishments are prescribed in a specific manner. With crimes
like burglary, for example, the punishment is not measured in proportion to the degree of
harm sustained by the victim; this offence has been penalized by amputating a hand in
order to reach the aims of giving a lesson and being a deterrent. These kinds of crimes are
perceived by God as intolerable, and thus deserve no less than the full application of their
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prescribed punishments. As such, commission of these crimes must be followed by
application of the required penal sanctions (Halemm et al. 2003).
The specific punishments that deter the criminal in Islam and prevent crime are
the following: imprisonment; banishment and exile from the place of the crime and the
city in which it was perpetrated; death; reprimand and rebuke; threat; boycott; publicizing
of the crime perpetrated; financial punishment by the seizing or destroying of wealth or
assets; and flogging, which is often the subject of much controversy (Halemm et al.
2003).
Flogging is one of the corporal punishments prescribed in the Qur’an. According
to Halemm et al. (2003), there is a physical effect of this punishment on the one who is
flogged, which directly encourages offenders to desist from crime now and in the future.
In addition they support that this punishment contains a psychological pain far greater
than any physical pain, which again serves as a deterrent. For instance, flogging is
mentioned in the Quran:
“The [unmarried] woman or [unmarried] man found guilty of sexual intercourse lash each one of them with a hundred lashes, and do not be taken by pity for them
in the religion of Allah, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. And let a
group of the believers witness their punishment” (Q.24:2)
According to Halemm et al. (2003), another benefit of flogging is that it can be
awarded in cases of all minor and major crimes, depending on the seriousness of the
offence. Also, flogging punishes only the offender. In this way, it differs from
punishments such as imprisonment, which also harm the prisoner’s family and children,
and also represents a waste of the community’s resources (Halemm et al., 2003).
Moreover, according to Islamic law supporters, this punishment is at times sufficient to
replace other punishments, such as imprisonment, which frequently brings criminals into
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contact with one another and provides opportunities for them to learn each other’s
criminal ways (Halemm et al. 2003).
Murder is identified as the most terrible crime in the Qur’an. The Qur’an allows
execution of murderers; however, it also recommends patience. It advises allowing time
and opportunity for forgiveness, reconciliation, and reform (Halemm et al. 2003). For
example, the Qur’an says, "And if you decide to punish, then punish with the like of that
with which you were afflicted. But if you show patience, it is certainly best for those who
remain patient" (Q.16:126).
Although the aforementioned punishments exist in Sharia, they have not been
applied in Turkey since 1924 with the Law Regarding the Abolition of Islamic Law
Courts and Amendments Regarding the Court Organization (Grigoriadis, 2013). The
Republic of Turkey was established in 1923 and it became one of the successor states of
the Ottoman Empire (Howard, 1958). Even though most of the population was Muslim,
religion and the state were separated in Turkey. Traditional sharia courts were eliminated
in the 1920s (PRC, 2013). Within the Ottoman, Turks generally identified themselves
primarily as Muslims. During the transition from the Ottoman to the Turkish republic,
Turkey followed Western models to become a nation-state (Shoen, 2013). Islam was
separated from Turkish national identity (Howard, 1958). After a separation of national
and religious identity, people of different religions were able to consider themselves as
belonging to the same nation (Shoen, 2013). In 1926, the new Turkish Penal Code
(inspired by the Italian Penal Code of 1889) came into operation. Although this new
penal code has been modified several times to adapt to the conditions of the country, its
essence has been preserved (Ansay & Wallace, 2011). It may be said that the Turkish
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Penal Code did not entirely penetrate Islam. However, it is rational to expect that Islamic
perceptions and levels of religiosity may affect culture, tradition, and, in turn public
opinion in Turkey.
Although there have been many studies on punitiveness conducted in Europe and
the United States, much less is known about Turkey. Ayten (2009) conducted one of the
few studies on this topic. This study found that Islam encourages people to forgive each
other. To illustrate the relationships among forgiveness, socio-demographics variables,
and religiosity, Ayten examined a Muslim sample from Istanbul-Turkey. Ayten found no
link between forgiveness and socio-economic variables, but religious people were more
forgiving and had fewer revenge feelings. The study showed that women were more
forgiving than were men and that older people tend to be more forgiving than younger
people.
Confidence in criminal justice institutions in Turkey
Apart from religiosity and public opinion about punishment, there are some
differences between the U.S. and Turkish criminal justice system. Police duties are
generally similar in both countries; they include enforcing laws, maintaining order,
protecting citizens, and preventing crimes (Nalla & Boke, 2011). However, Turkey has a
centralized police organization and the U.S. has a decentralized system. The U.S police
system is community-oriented in nature. Turkish police officers perceive that their first
priority is to serve the government rather than the citizen, and thus police are always seen
as government agents and not as public servants (Nalla & Boke, 2011). In addition, there
are some differences between the U.S. and Turkish justice systems. In general, while
Turkey has a centralized court system, the U.S. court system is divided into two
37

administratively separate systems; the federal and the state. Erhan (1968) claims that
centralized system may accelerate to take a decision. Also, the Turkish court system does
not recognize the concept of the jury. This absence brings some advantages, like not
losing time to choosing a jury (Erhan, 1968).
Studies conducted in Turkey show that confidence levels in the police and the
justice system are getting lower each year. For example, between 2011 and 2013, Kadir
Has University conducted a study of adult respondents in 26 different cities (Aydin et al.,
2014). The results showed that confidence in the justice system is decreasing year by year
in Turkey. Approximately one out of four people trusted the justice system in 2013.
Levels of public trust in the justice system were 38.8% in 2011, 32.7% in 2012, and
26.5% in 2013. Furthermore, the percentage of people who do not trust the justice system
was almost 50.4% in 2013 (Aydin et al., 2014). Apart from confidence in the justice
system, confidence in the president, military, politicians, media, and the police were also
measured in the research. The most dramatic decreases were for confidence in the police
system. While trust in the police was 52.7% in 2011, it declined to 35.3% in 2013 (Unal,
2014). According to Dag Medya (2014), this decrease is due in part to the Gezi Park
Protests. In 2013, the Turkish government wanted to cut down trees and build a shopping
center in the Gezi Park in Istanbul. People protested this construction and started a
peaceful protest aimed at saving the trees in the Gezi Park (The Guardian, 2014). Police
used unnecessary and abusive force, including tear gas, pepper spray, water cannons,
beatings, rubber bullets, and live ammunition on protestors. The public was irritated
because of the government’s violent reaction and protests swept across Turkey. Almost
one month later, eight people died, at least four as a result of police violence. About
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8,000 people were injured, 104 sustained serious head injuries, and 11 people lost an eye,
most as a result of plastic bullets fired by the police. People who had supported, reported
on, or even tweeted the protests lost their jobs. Members of the public believe that police
officers are responsible for abuses to justice (Amnesty International, 2013).
Even though confidence levels seem low in Turkey, comparison to some nations
shows that confidence in the police is actually higher than some other countries. For
example, Cao and Burton (2006) analyzed data from the European and World Values
Surveys to demonstrate cross-national public opinions toward the police. They examined
levels of public confidence in the police in Turkey and compared their findings to 24
members of the EU (e.g., France, Germany, Greece, and Poland), to Turkey’s
neighboring countries (e.g., Iran, Bulgaria, Romania, and Azerbaijan), and to other
Muslim nations (e.g., Morocco, Iran, Pakistan, and Egypt). Their data analysis revealed
that more than two-thirds (71%) of Turkish respondents said that they had either a great
deal of confidence or quite a lot of confidence in their police. The results suggest that
support for the Turkish police ranks highly compared to 24 nations within the EU.
Turkey’s percentage is among the top 33 percent of all nations in the EU. Countries that
have higher levels of confidence than Turkey include Denmark (91%), Finland (90%),
Ireland (86%), Austria (75%), Sweden (75%), and Germany (71%). Nations with lower
levels of confidence include Great Britain (68.8%), Italy (67.3%), The Netherlands
(64%), Spain (59%), and Belgium (55%). Moreover, this study showed that public
confidence in the police is higher for Turkey (70.7%) than for its neighboring countries,
including Iran (61%), Bulgaria (47%), Russia (29%), and Greece (28%). Also, regarding
their level of confidence in the police, Turkey is third among 12 Muslim nations. Even
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though Jordan (91%) and Egypt (87%) state higher public rankings than Turkey (70.7%),
several Muslim countries such as Albania (65%), Iran (61%), Azerbaijan (41%), and
Pakistan (29%) fall behind Turkey.
Confidence in the legal authorities is high in Turkey because even when the
police were criticized by the West for their violation of human rights, they gained public
support for their tough action against minorities. This police action was highly supported
by the Turkish majority, most notably by political elites (Cao and Burton, 2006).
Relatedly, according to Kirmizag (2015), minorities (e.g., Shia, Kurdish people) have less
confidence than others in Turkey.
In sum, religious beliefs affect people’s attitudes and opinions, including their
perceptions about punishment and their confidence in legal authorities. Religious people
are more likely to support harsh punishments like incarceration and the death penalty
than are non-religious people. These levels of punitiveness in Turkey are likely than those
in the U.S. Previous studies have also shown that more religious people tend to have
more confidence in the police and the justice system. The success of the police and the
courts depends on public confidence, because when people trust these organizations, they
are more likely to support and cooperate with them. Levels of confidence in the police
and in the justice system are likely higher in Turkey than in the U.S.
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DATA AND METHODS
This research uses data from the United States and Turkey to examine how
religiosity affects public attitudes about punitiveness and confidence in criminal justice
institutions. Specifically, this study will start by analyzing how respondents’ religious
attitudes and behaviors affect their beliefs about the importance of severe punishment as
a characteristic of democracy. Next, it will examine how religiosity affects respondents'
confidence in the police and the justice system. Finally, it will compare the results from
the United States to those of Turkey. Based on prior research, several hypotheses can be
generated that will be tested in this project.
Research hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
People who are more religious are more punitive. For the purpose of the current
study, punitiveness refers to people's beliefs about the importance of severe punishment
as a characteristic of democracy. Numerous studies have shown that more religious
people tend to be more punitive than less religious people in their response to crime.
They are more likely support harsh punishments like incarceration and the death penalty
(Ellison, 1991; Grasmick et al., 1993; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004; Grasmick and
McGill, 1994; Gelb, 2011). Level of religiosity is important because it shapes the
frequency of using severe criminal sentences (Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004).
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Because the WVS asks about severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy,
it is also important to consider how religion relates to feelings about democracy.
Belonging to religious organizations, being politically active, and discussing politics with
others positively influences people’s attitudes about democracy. People who are members
of a religious organization or are religiously dedicated, engaged in political and social
networks, and hold higher social status, view democracy very positively (Meyer, Tope,
and Price, 2008). According to previous studies, higher levels of religiosity increase
beliefs about the importance of democracy among both Christians and Muslims (Grundel
and Maliepaard, 2012; Meyer et al., 2008; Bratton, 2003; Patterson, 2004).
Hypothesis 2
Levels of punitiveness (i.e., beliefs about severe punishment as a characteristic of
democracy) are higher in Turkey than in the U.S. While the U.S. is more diverse in its
religious makeup, Turkey is more homogenous. Religious homogeneity likely represents
the shared cultural and political influence of policies and it affects formal and informal
case processing and sentencing norms. Homogeneous religious communities favor more
punitive criminal sanctions and incarceration (Ulmer et al., 2008). Therefore, Turkish
communities may favor more punitive criminal sanctions than the U.S.
If people feel vulnerable and insecure, rationally or not, they often look for
someone, something, or some group to blame. Hard economic times, rapid social change,
beliefs about the loss of respect and discipline in society, and concerns about social
cohesion and perceived social threat lead people to feel more vulnerable and insecure.
These feelings may, in turn, lead to a more punitive-minded general public (Hardisty,
2004; Tyler and Boeckann, 1997; King and Maruna, 2009). Compared to the U.S.,
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Turkish people are more likely to feel vulnerable and insecure because Turkey has an
unstable economy (Boratav et al., 1996), is politically unstable (e.g., three military
interventions that is military force into the current governance; Akbaba and Morrison,
2012), and is more likely to be under terrorist attacks (Global Terrorism Index, 2014).
Because people are more likely to desire conformity, social order, and discipline, they
look to legal institutions to punish threats to collective security. Concerns about social
cohesion and feeling of insecurity may lead Turkish people to support more severe
punishments.
Hypothesis 3
People who are more religious tend to have more confidence in the police and in
the justice system. Religiosity reflects a generalized willingness to trust authority,
regardless of whether the authority is secular or religious. Belief in God and a generally
high level of trust in religion influences confidence in the authorities. Stronger religiosity
would be associated with greater trust in authorities (Wisneski et al., 2009). If this is true,
I would expect to find that people who are religious have more confidence in the police
and in the justice system.
Hypothesis 4
Levels of confidence in the police and in the justice system are higher in Turkey
than in the U.S. Individuals from different societies (with their differing cultures and
religions) may develop different attitudes toward the police and the justice system (Cao
and Huo, 2001). Public confidence in the legal authorities tends to increase when society
becomes more democratic (Cao and Zhao, 2005). Confidence in the legal authorities is
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high in Turkey because Turkey has become more democratic over the years and the
Turkish criminal justice system increasingly behave in a more popular way to appeal to
the mainstream of the Turkish public. Even when the West criticized Turkish police for
their violations of human rights, they gained public support for their tough actions against
minorities. This police action was highly supported by the Turkish majority, most notably
by political elites (Cao and Burton, 2006). I would expect that confidence in the police
and the justice system are higher in Turkey than in the U.S.
Data
To test these hypotheses, I use data from the World Value Survey (WVS). WVS
is a non-profit organization that includes a global network of social scientists
investigating values and their effects on social and political life. The WVS has completed
six waves of surveys from 1981 to 2012. They have used a standardized questionnaire to
analyze more deeply the causes and consequences of change in the beliefs and values
concerning religion, democracy, political participation, economic developments,
environmental protection, gender roles, subjective well-being, social capital, and good
governance. Research has been conducted in almost 100 countries and each country
conducts its own national survey (WVS, 2015).
I will use Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the WVS for the current study. Although Wave
6 is now available, it will not be used because there are no questions about punitiveness.
Wave 5 was conducted in over 40 countries. Of these 40 countries, only the United States
and Turkey will be used.
The U.S data were collected in 2006. In general, a simple random sample was
used from active panel members who were 18 years of age and older. When participants
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were selected, they received a letter about the questionnaire by email. Then, once the
survey was available, they received a second email that included the survey. If
respondents did not contribute, they received a reminder email. (WebTV appliances (i.e.,
a web camera designed to facilitate interviewing) were used for face-to-face interviews.)
Of the 1,710 people who were selected from the panel to participate in the survey, 1,249
responded. The response rate is 73.04%.
Turkish data were collected in 2007 using personal face-to-face interviews. Of the
1,815 adults who were randomly selected, 1,346 completed the survey. The response rate
is 74.15%. The survey sampling consisted of three steps. First, blocks of 150 households
each were randomly selected. Second, addresses inside the blocks were randomly
selected. Third, a randomly selected individual was interviewed within the household.
Another random selection of households, using NUTS-11, was made within the same
statistical block in cases of invalid addresses and hard refusals.
Dependent variables
In prior research, public perceptions about punishment have been measured in
several ways, including support for the death penalty, for life sentences, and/or for
harsher local courts (Unnever et al. 2005). In the current study, one question will be used
to measure public attitudes toward punishment: “How essential do you think ‘criminals
are severely punished’ is as a characteristic of democracy?” This measure is coded on a

1

There are 12 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) in Turkey. This

system subdivides of countries for statistical purposes.
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Likert scale ranging from 1 = “not an essential characteristic of democracy” to 10 = “an
essential characteristic of democracy.”
Two items will be used to measure confidence in the criminal justice system:
confidence in the police and confidence in the justice system. Confidence in the police
(“Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the police?”) is coded as 1 =
“none at all," 2 = "not very much," 3 = “a great deal," and 4 = "quite a lot.” These
categories were collapsed to create a dichotomous variable coded 0 for "none at all or not
very much" and 1 for "a great deal or quite a lot." Confidence in the justice system
(“Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the justice system?”) is coded as 1
= “none at all," 2 = "not very much,” 3 = “a great deal," and 4 = "quite a lot." Again,
these categories were collapsed to create a dichotomous variable coded 0 for "none at all
or not very much" and 1 for "a great deal or quite a lot."
Independent variables
Five separate measures will be used to measure religiosity, the primary independent
variable:
1.

Religious importance: “How important religion is in your life?” (coded
1 = “not at all important,” 2 = “not very important,” 3 = “rather
important,” and 4 = “very important”)

2.

Membership in a religious organization: “Could you tell me whether you
are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of church or
religious organization?” (coded 0 = “not a member” and 1 = “inactive
member or active member”)

3.

Attendance at religious services: “Apart from weddings, funeral and
christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these
days?” (coded 1 = “never,” 2 = “less often,” 3 = “once a year,” 4 = “only
holy days,” 5 = “once a month,” 6 = “once a week,” and 7 = “more than
once a week”)
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4.

Religious person: “Independently of whether you attend religious services
or not, would you say you are…?” (coded as 1 = "A religious person,"
2 = "Not a religious person," 3 = "A convinced atheist," and 4 = "Other
answer." However, to make a dummy variable recoded as 0 = “not a
religious person or a convinced atheist and other answer” and 1 = “a
religious person,”)

5.

Importance of God: “How important is God in your life?” (coded on a
scale ranging from 1 = “not at all” to 10 = “very”)

When analyzing the U.S. data, this study will also examine the effects of religious
affiliation using the question “Do you belong to a religious denomination? If yes, which
one?” This variable was originally coded as 9 different denominations (i.e., none,
Buddhist, Hindu, Jew, Muslim, Orthodox, Protestant, Roman Catholic, and other) in the
U.S. data. (Except none, Orthodox, Protestant, and Roman Catholic, rest of
denominations recoded as "other"). However, I recoded and created five dummy
variables (1) 1 = "None" and 0 = "Else," (2) 1 = "Orthodox" and 0 = "Else," (3) 1 =
"Protestant" and 0 = "Else," (4) 1 = "Roman Catholic" and 0 = "Else," and (5) 1 = "Other"
and 0 = "Else."
Three demographic variables will be included in the analyses. These are gender (0
= “female,” 1 = “male”), age (in years), and education (nine categories ranging from 1 =
“no formal education” to 9 = “university-level education, with degree”).
Control variables
This study uses as control variables two items measuring public opinion about
democracy: “How democratically is this country being governed today?” (coded on a
Likert scale ranging from 1 = “not at all democratic” to 10 = “completely democratic”)
and “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?”
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(coded on a Likert scale ranging from 1 = “not at all important” to 10 = “absolutely
important”).
Cases listed as “missing; not asked by interviewer, not asked,” “not applicable,”
“no answer,” or “don’t know” were coded as missing for all variables.
Analysis Plan
The purpose of this study is to examine how religiosity affects public perceptions
about punishment and public confidence in the police and the justice system. It further
examines the effects of demographic variables such as age, gender, and education on
these outcomes.
The analyses will proceed in three stages. First, I will conduct descriptive
analyses of the two samples: the U.S. and Turkey. Second, I will present a correlation
matrix showing the bivariate relationships among the independent and dependent
variables. Third, I will use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine the effects
of religiosity on public perceptions about punishment and binary logistic regression to
examine its effects on confidence in the police and the courts. Finally, I will use a t-test
and chi-square to determine whether any significant differences exist between the U.S.
and Turkey in terms of their levels of public perceptions about punishment and chisquare will be used to determine confidence in the police and the justice system.
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RESULTS
This chapter begins by describing the results of the U.S. analyses. This includes a
description of the sample, bivariate correlations among the independent and dependent
variables, and the results of the regression analyses. Next, it describes the results of the
Turkish analyses. This also includes a description of the sample, bivariate correlations
among the independent and dependent variables, and the results of the regression
analyses. Then, it compares results of the U.S. and those of Turkey.
U.S. Data
Descriptive analyses
The U.S. sample includes 1,249 respondents. As shown in Table 1, the sample
includes equal proportions of males (50.0%) and females (50.0%). The average age of the
sample is about 48. The most common highest educational level is technical/vocational
type secondary school (33.3%), followed by university preparatory type secondary school
(21.8%). All respondents completed at least primary school and 2.0% received university
level education with degree. In terms of their religious affiliation, Protestants (33.6%) are
the largest group, followed by no religious affiliation (26.2%), Roman Catholics (21.5%),
others (18.4%), and Orthodox (0.3%). In addition, Table 1 shows that more than half
(54.4%) of the participants mention that living in a country that is governed
democratically is absolutely important. Only 7.8% of Americans state that the U.S. is
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completely democratic today (i.e., a 10 on a 10-point scale); the median response is 7.0
(M = 6.4).
Table 1 indicates that 19.5% of participants believe severe punishment of
criminals is an essential characteristic of democracy (i.e., a 10 on a 10-point scale). The
median response is 7.0 (M = 6.8), which is above the scale midpoint of 5.0. At the
opposite end of the spectrum, 5.5% of people think severe punishment of criminals is not
an essential characteristic of democracy (i.e., a 1 on a 10-point scale). Table 1 also shows
that while 73.3% of respondents have quite a lot or a great deal confidence in the police,
only 58.2% of them have quite a lot or a great deal confidence in the justice system.
In terms of religiosity, Table 1 shows that almost half (46.8%) of respondents say
that religion is very important in their life and only 8.2% of people say religion is not at
all important. In addition, 65.8% of people report being a member (either an inactive
member or an active member) of a church or religious organizations. Apart from
weddings, funerals and christenings, the percentage of people attending religious services
is as follows: 12.3% attending more than once a week, 24.5% attending once a week,
10.8% of people attending once a month, 9.1% of people attending only on holy days,
4.3% attending once a year, 12.4% attending less often, and 26.6% attending never.
Regardless of whether they attended religious services or not, 74.5% of Americans
consider themselves a religious person. Over half (57%) of participants mention that God
is very important in their life.
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Table 4.1

Description of the U.S. Respondents in Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the World
Value Survey

Gender
Male
Female
Age (in years)
Education
No formal education
Incomplete primary school
Complete primary school
Incomplete secondary school: tech./voc. type
Complete secondary school: tech./voc. type
Incomplete secondary school: univ.-prep.
type
Complete secondary school: univ.-prep. type
Some university-level edu., without degree
University-level education, with degree
Religious Denomination
None
Orthodox
Protestant
Roman Catholic
Other
Importance of democracy
Not at all important
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Absolutely important
Democraticness in own country
Not at all democratic
2
3
4
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Percent Mean Median
1.0
50.0
50.0
48.0
48.0
5.8
6.0
0.0
0.0
3.8
11.4
33.3
19.5
21.8
8.2
2.0
26.2
0.3
33.6
21.5
18.4
1.1
0.3
0.7
0.5
8.0
5.7
5.1
9.5
14.8
54.4
4.2
2.5
4.8
6.4

SD
0.5
17.0
1.3

2.0

1.4

8.7

10

1.9

6.4

7.0

2.3

Table 4.1 (continued)
5
6
7
8
9
Completely democratic
Importance of Severe Punishment
Not an essential characteristic of democracy
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
An essential characteristic of democracy
Confidence in the police
None at all
Not very much
Quite a lot
A great deal
Confidence in the Justice
None at all
Not very much
Quite a lot
A great deal
Importance of religion
Not at all important
Not very important
Rather important
Very important
Membership of religious organization
Not a member
Inactive or active member
Attending religious services
Never
Less often
Once a year
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16.8
12.1
17.8
17.8
9.9
7.8
5.5
2.9
5.1
4.3
15.5
9.2
12.2
12.9
12.9
19.5
3.4
23.3
56.1
17.2
5.5
36.4
49.0
9.2
8.2
19.2
25.8
46.8
34.2
65.8
26.6
12.4
4.3

6.8

7.0

2.6

2.8

3.0

0.7

2.6

3.0

0.7

3.1

3.0

1.0

0.7

1.0

0.5

3.9

4.0

2.3

Table 4.1 (continued)
Only holy days
Once a month
Once a week
More than once a week
Religious person
Not a religious person or a convinced atheist
and other
A religious person
Importance of God
Not at all
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Very
(N=1249)

9.1
10.8
24.5
12.3
25.5
74.5
5.3
1.7
2.3
2.1
5.2
5.2
5.3
7.6
8.5
57.0

0.8

1.0

0.4

8.3

10.0

2.7

Bivariate correlations
I calculated correlations among the dependent and independent variables. These
results, which are presented in Table 2, indicate that Americans' beliefs about punishment
(i.e., about the importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy) are
positively associated with religiosity. Specifically, people who believe religion and God
are important are more likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential
characteristic of democracy. There is also a positive correlation between beliefs about
punishment and people who are members of a religious organization and who consider
themselves religious. Overall, the correlations between beliefs about punishment and
religiosity are weak. In addition to religiosity, Table 2 shows that there is significant
negative correlation between education and public opinions about punishment. Although
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the relationship between gender and beliefs about punishment is not significant, age has a
weak positive association with punitiveness.
In addition, opinions about democracy have a weak positive association with
opinions about punishment. People who believe living in a democratic country is
important tend to also believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of
democracy. Opinions about democracy and religiosity are also positively related.
Specifically, there is a weak positive correlation between believing that living in a
democratic country is important and believing that God is important.
Confidence in the police and the justice system are both positively related to
religiosity. There is a positive relationship between being a member of a religious
organization and confidence in the police and the justice system. Also, attending religious
services is positively associated with confidence in the police and the justice system.
Regarding demographic characteristics, age is positively associated with confidence in
the police and education is positively associated with confidence in the justice system.
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Confidence in the Police

Confidence in the Justice

Importance of Religion

Membership of Religious Org.

Attending Religious Services

Religious Person

Importance of God

Importance of Democracy

Democraticness in Own Country

Gender

Age (in years)

Education

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

Note. *p<0.05. **p<0.01

-0.069*

0.129**

0.015

0.155**

0.233**

0.138**

0.097**

0.048

0.073*

0.080**

0.032

0.149**

Importance of Severe Punishment 1.000

1

0.032

0.133**

-0.047

0.242**

0.140**

0.089**

0.087**

0.131**

0.140**

0.098**

0.635**

1.000

2

0.070*

0.056

-0.006

0.239**

0.081**

0.055

0.068*

0.100**

0.120**

0.086**

1.000

3

-0.074**

0.130**

-0.144**

0.112**

-0.014

0.682**

0.590**

0.604**

0.560**

1.000

4

Bivariate Correlations Between Dependent and Independent Variables

1.

Table 4.2
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0.088**

0.079**

-0.063*

0.164**

0.062*

0.423**

0.412**

0.631**

1.000

5

0.080**

0.074*

-0.086**

0.116**

0.058*

0.440**

0.410**

1.000

6

-0.002

0.144**

-0.124**

0.121**

0.066*

0.644**

1.000

7

Importance of Severe Punishment

Confidence in the Police

Confidence in the Justice

Importance of Religion

Membership of Religious Org.

Attending Religious Services

Religious Person

Importance of God

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Table 4.2 (continued)

Democraticness in Own Country

Gender

Age (in years)

Education

10.

11.

12.

13.

Note. *p<0.05. **p<0.01

Importance of Democracy

9.
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-0.061*

0.142**

-0.140**

0.118**

0.089**

1.000

8

10

0.047

0.057*

1.000

11

0.191** 0.088** 0.036

0.270** 0.073*

0.015

0.353** 1.000

1.000

9

-0.079*

1.000

12

1.000

13

Regression analyses
The results presented in Table 3 describe four regression models predicting
respondents' opinions about punishment in the United States. I started by examining the
effects of religious affiliation on public opinions about punishment (i.e., beliefs about the
importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy; Model 1). Next, I
added the demographic variables (Model 2), measures religiosity (Model 3), and public
opinions about democracy (Model 4).
In order to examine the effects of religious affiliation on public opinions about the
importance of severe punishment, I created five dummy variables (1) 1 = "None" and 0 =
"Else," (2) 1 = " Orthodox" and 0 = "Else," (3) 1 = "Protestant" and 0 = "Else," (4) 1 =
"Roman Catholic" and 0 = "Else," and (5) 1 = "Other" and 0 = "Else." Table 3 shows that,
in Model 1, Protestant is the reference variable. People who have no religious affiliation
were on average 0.78 points less likely than Protestants to think severe punishment is an
essential characteristic of democracy.
Table 3 shows that, in Model 2, age (b=0.02, p<.01) and education level (b=0.17,
p<.01) related significantly to beliefs about punishment. Specifically, older respondents
are more likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of
democracy; a one year increase in age corresponded with a .02 unit increase in beliefs
about punishment. More educated respondents are less likely to believe that severe
punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy, such that a one unit increase in
education corresponded with a .17 unit decrease in beliefs about punishment. The effect
of gender on beliefs about punishment is not significant.
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Model 3 shows that beliefs about the importance of God (b=0.13, p<.01)
significantly affected beliefs about punishment; a one-unit increase in beliefs about the
importance of God corresponded to a 0.13 unit increase in beliefs about severe
punishment as an essential characteristic of democracy. In the final model (Model 4),
both importance of democracy and democraticness in one's own country are statistically
significant. For each one-unit increase in beliefs about these variables, opinions about
severe punishment as an essential characteristic of democracy increase by 0.28 and 0.09
units, respectively.
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Constant
N
R square
*p<0.05. **p<0.01.

7.05
1178
0.012

b
-0.78
-0.30
-0.04
-0.42
----------0.13

** 7.20
1178
0.027

0.47

**

6.51
1162
0.033

0.60

**

Importance of Severe Punishment
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
SE
b
SE
b
SE
0.20 ** -0.72 0.21 ** -0.56 0.24 *
1.33
0.10 1.32
0.00 1.31
0.21
0.00 0.21
0.01 0.21
0.22
-0.29 0.23
-0.24 0.23
-0.11
0.15
0.14 0.16
-0.02
0.01 ** 0.01 0.01 **
--0.17 0.06 ** -0.15 0.06 *
----0.17 0.13
---0.11 0.23
----0.03 0.05
---0.12 0.24
---0.13 0.04 **
-----------

OLS Regression Models Predicting Importance of Severe Punishment

No Affiliation
Orthodox
Catholic
Other
Gender
Age (in years)
Education Level
Importance of Religion
Membership of Relig. Org.
Attending Religious Services
Religious Person
Importance of God
Importance of Democracy
Democ. in Own Country

Table 4.3
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4.29
1144
0.083

b
-0.37
-0.16
0.08
-0.05
0.13
0.01
-0.24
-0.07
0.04
-0.03
0.07
0.10
0.28
0.09
0.65

**

Model 4
SE
0.24
1.28
0.21
0.23
0.15
0.01
0.06 **
0.13
0.22
0.05
0.24
0.04 *
0.05 **
0.04 *

Table 4 shows the results of the binary logistic regression models predicting
respondents' confidence in both the police and the justice system in the United States.
The dependent variables are coded "0" for respondents who reported "none at all" or "not
very much" confidence and "1" for respondents who reported having "a great deal" or
"quite a lot" of confidence. Thus, these analyses compare people who have a lot of
confidence to those who do not. I started by examining the effects of the demographic
variables on confidence (Model 1), and then added the religiosity measures (Model 2).
Across both sets of models, for both confidence in the police and confidence in
the justice system, only demographic variables are significant. Specifically, age is
positively related to having a lot of confidence; a one-unit change in age increased the
odds of having a lot of confidence in police by a factor of 1.014. Older people are 1.014
times more likely to have confidence in the police. Also, the relationship between
education and confidence is positive; more educated people are 1.126 times more likely
to have confidence in the police and 1.137 times more likely to have confidence in the
justice system.2

2

The odds ratio computed by raising e to the power of the logistic coefficient.
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*p<0.05. **p<0.01.

Constant
N
R square

-0.26
1212
0.021

-0.49
1176
0.041

0.08
-0.08
0.04

---0.36

0.30

--

0.45

0.04
0.21
0.04

0.19

Confidence in the Police
Model 1
Model 2
SE
b
SE
0.13
-0.09
0.14
0.00 **
0.01
0.00 **
0.05 *
0.10
0.05 *
--0.14
0.11

-0.64
1207
0.011

----

--

b
-0.02
0.01
0.13
--

0.33

----

--

*

-0.96
1171
0.027

0.05
0.02
0.02

0.23

0.41

0.04
0.19
0.03

0.17

*

Confidence in the Justice
Model 1
Model 2
SE
b
SE
0.12
0.02
0.12
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04 ** 0.12
0.05 *
--0.03
0.10

Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting Confidence in the Police and the Justice System

b
Gender
-0.14
Age (in years)
0.01
Education Level
0.12
Importance of Religion -Membership of
Religious Org.
-Attending Religious
Services
-Religious Person
-Importance of God
--

Table 4.4

61

In sum, the bivariate correlations show that religiosity is positively associated
with Americans' beliefs about punishment (i.e., about the importance of severe
punishment as a characteristic of democracy). Regarding the demographic variables, age
and education level positively relate to belief that severe punishment is an essential
characteristic of democracy. The effect on gender on beliefs about punishment is not
significant. In addition, the bivariate analyses show that both beliefs about punishment
and religiosity have a weak positive association with opinions about democracy.
Although the bivariate correlations analyses show that confidence in the police
and the justice system are both positively related to religiosity, logistic regression show
that the association is not significant. Regarding demographic characteristics, older and
more educated people have more confidence in the police and the justice system.
In addition, regression analyses show that Protestants are more likely than those
with no religious affiliation to think severe punishment is an essential characteristic of
democracy. Regression analyses also confirm the finding from the bivariate analyses that
people who believe God are important are more likely to believe that severe punishment
is an essential characteristic of democracy. Older people are more likely support beliefs
about severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy and more educated
people are less likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of
democracy, but the effect of gender on beliefs about punishment is not significant.
Turkish Data
Descriptive analyses
The Turkish sample includes 1,346 respondents. As shown in Table 5, the sample
includes almost equal proportions of males (50.2%) and females (49.8%). The average
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age of the sample is about 36. The most common highest educational level is primary
school (36.0%), followed by university preparatory type secondary school (26.8%) and
university level education (11.1%). In addition, Table 6 shows that more than half
(56.2%) of the participants mention that living in a country that is governed
democratically is absolutely important (i.e., a 10 on a 10-point scale). Only 8.5% of
Turkish respondents state that Turkey is completely democratic today (i.e., a 10 on a 10point scale); the median response is 6.0 (M = 5.9).
Table 5 indicates that 39.7% of participants believe severe punishment of
criminals is an essential characteristic of democracy (i.e., a 10 on a 10-point scale). The
median response is 8.0 (M = 7.8), which is above the scale midpoint of 5.0. At the
opposite end of the spectrum, only 3.2% of people think severe punishment of criminals
is not an essential characteristic of democracy (i.e., a 1 on a 10-point scale). Table 1 also
shows that 71.6% of respondents have quite a lot or a great deal confidence in the police
and 75.0% of them have quite a lot or a great deal confidence in the justice system.
In terms of religiosity, Table 5 shows that the majority of participants (75.0%) say
that religion is very important in their life; only 2.8% of people say religion is not at all
important. In addition, almost all respondents (97.3%) report not being a member of
religious organizations. This finding may be because people are more likely to practice
their religion in private in Turkey. Also, the complex relationship between politics and
religion may mean that religious organization that are legal today may be illegal
tomorrow. Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, the percentage of people
attending religious services is as follows: 13.9% attending more than once a week, 20.4%
attending once a week, 2.0% attending once a month, 23.6% attending only holy days,
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3.6% attending once a year, 3.9% attending less often, and 32.6% attending never.
Regardless of whether they attended religious services or not, 82.1% of participants
consider themselves a religious person. The majority of participants (76.2%) mention that
God is very important in their life.
Table 4.5

Description of Turkish Respondents in Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the World
Value Survey

Gender
Male
Female
Age (in years)
Education
No formal education
Incomplete primary school
Complete primary school
Incomplete secondary school: tech./voc. type
Complete secondary school: tech./voc. type
Incomplete sec. school: univ.-prep. type
Complete secondary school: univ.-prep. type
Some university-level edu., without degree
University-level education, with degree
Importance of democracy
Not at all important
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Absolutely important
Democraticness in own country
Not at all democratic
2
3
4
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Percent Mean Median SD
1.0
0.5
50.2
49.8
36.4
33.0
13.9
4.9
4.0
2.5
8.1
3.8
36.0
2.6
7.2
3.3
26.8
1.0
11.1
9.1
10.0
1.5
0.5
0.7
0.1
0.2
1.4
3.3
5.1
13.2
19.4
56.2
5.9
6.0
2.5
7.7
4.5
7.3
8.3

Table 4.5 (continued)
5
6
7
8
9
Completely democratic
Importance of Severe Punishment
Not an essential characteristic of democracy
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
An essential characteristic of democracy
Confidence in the police
None at all
Not very much
Quite a lot
A great deal
Confidence in the Justice
None at all
Not very much
Quite a lot
A great deal
Importance of religion
Not at all important
Not very important
Rather important
Very important
Membership of religious organization
Not a member
Inactive or active member
Attending religious services
Never
Less often
Once a year
65

10.8
16.5
15.8
13.5
7.0
8.5
3.2
2.1
2.4
2.7
7.9
7.2
10.4
15.7
8.8
39.7
11.0
17.4
35.4
36.2
8.6
16.4
38.7
36.3
2.8
5.8
16.4
75.0
97.3
2.7
32.6
3.9
3.6

7.8

8.0

2.5

3.0

3.0

1.0

3.0

3.0

0.9

3.6

4.0

0.7

0.0

0.0

0.2

3.8

4.0

2.3

Table 4.5 (continued)
Only holy days
Once a month
Once a week
More than once a week
Religious person
Not a religious person or a convinced atheist
and other
A religious person
Importance of God
Not at all
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Very
(N=1346)

23.6
2.0
20.4
13.9
17.9
82.1
0.9
0.5
0.4
0.7
1.1
2.2
3.7
5.7
8.7
76.2

0.8

1.0

0.4

9.4

10.0

1.5

Bivariate correlations
I calculated correlations among the dependent and independent variables. These
results, which are presented in Table 6, indicate that Turks' beliefs about punishment (i.e.,
about the importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy) are
positively associated with religiosity. Specifically, people who attend religious services
and believe God is important are more likely to believe that severe punishment is an
essential characteristic of democracy. Overall, the correlations between beliefs about
punishment and religiosity are weak. In addition to religiosity, Table 6 shows that gender
has a weak positive association with opinions about severe punishment, while age and
education are not significant.
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Additionally, opinions about democracy have a weak positive association with
opinions about punishment. People who believe living in a democratic country is
important tend to also believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of
democracy. Opinions about democracy and religiosity are also positively related.
Specifically, people who think religion is important and consider one's self a religious
person are more likely believe Turkey is a democratic country today.
Confidence in the police and the justice system are both positively related to
religiosity. There was a positive relationship between attending religious services and
confidence in the police and the justice system. Also, considering one's self a religious
person is positively associated with confidence in the police and the justice system.
Regarding demographic characteristics, gender and education are negatively associated
with confidence in the police and the justice system and age is positively associated with
confidence in the police and the justice system.
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Imp. of Severe Punishment

Confidence in the Police

Confidence in the Justice

Importance of Religion

Membership of Religious Org.

Attending Religious Services

Religious Person

Importance of God

Importance of Democracy

Democ. in Own Country

Gender

Age (in years)

Education

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

Note. *p<0.05. **p<0.01

-0.043

0.048

0.091**

0.111**

0.075**

0.087**

0.018

0.138**

0.020

0.047

0.093**

0.134**

1.000

1

-0.235**

0.081**

-0.094**

0.323**

0.019

0.258**

0.262**

0.147**

-0.032

0.295**

0.588**

1.000

2

-0.202**

0.086**

-0.096**

0.283**

0.071*

0.199**

0.186**

0.106**

-0.030

0.214**

1.000

3

-0.311**

0.0131**

-0.073**

0.0173**

-0.025

0.469**

0.418**

0.273**

0.013

1.000

4

Bivariate Correlations between Dependent and Independent Variables

1.

Table 4.6
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0.019

0.069*

0.082**

-0.026

0.001

0.010

0.003

0.094**

1.000

5

-0.036

0.184**

0.527**

0.151**

0.025

0.220**

0.230**

1.000

6

-0.270**

0.116**

-0.077**

0.160**

-0.042

0.406**

1.000

7

Importance of Severe Punishment

Confidence in the Police

Confidence in the Justice

Importance of Religion

Membership of Religious Org.

Attending Religious Services

Religious Person

Importance of God

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Table 4.6 (continued)

Democraticness in Own Country

Gender

Age (in years)

Education

10.

11.

12.

13.

Note. *p<0.05. **p<0.01

Importance of Democracy

9.
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-0.220**

0.087**

-0.095**

0.199**

0.065*

1.000

8

0.018

0.026

0.044

0.080**

1.000

9

-0.099**

0.052

-0.003

1.000

10

0.171**

0.047

1.000

11

-0.379**

1.000

12

1.000

13

Regression analyses
The results presented Table 7 describe three regression models predicting
respondents' opinions about punishment in Turkey. I started by examining the effects of
the demographic variables on public opinions about punishment (i.e., beliefs about the
importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy; Model 1), then added
variables measuring religiosity (Model 2) and public opinions about democracy (Model
3).
Table 7 shows that, in Model 1, gender (b=0.48, p<.01) relates significantly to
beliefs about punishment; men are, on average, .48 points more likely to think severe
punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. Age and education level are not
significant.
Model 2 shows that beliefs about the importance of God (b=0.13, p<.05) and
attendance at religious services (b=0.13, p<.01) significantly affect beliefs about
punishment; a one unit increase in these variables corresponds to a 0.13 unit increase in
beliefs about severe punishment as an essential characteristic of democracy. In the final
model (Model 3), both importance of democracy (b=0.11, p<.05) and democraticness in
one's own country (b=0.08, p<.01) are positively associate with the belief that
punishment is an essential characteristic of demo
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Constant
N
R square
*p<0.05. **p<0.01

7.65
1296
0.010

0.29**

Model 1
b
SE
0.48
0.14**
0.01
0.01
-0.05
0.03
--------------6.47
1254
0.021

0.64**

5.36
1211
0.030

0.77**

Opinion About Punishment
Model 2
Model 3
b
SE
b
SE
0.18
0.17
0.18
0.18
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
-0.04
0.03
-0.05
0.03
-0.03
0.12
-0.04
0.12
0.05
0.43
0.09
0.43
0.13
0.04**
0.11
0.04**
-0.29
0.21
-0.25
0.21
0.13
0.06*
0.11
0.06
--0.11
0.05*
--0.08
0.03**

OLS Regression Models Predicting Importance of Severe Punishment

Gender
Age (in years)
Education Level
Importance of Religion
Membership of Religious Org.
Attending Religious Services
Religious Person
Importance of God
Importance of Democracy
Democraticness in Own Country

Table 4.7
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Table 8 shows the results of the binary logistic regression models predicting
respondents' confidence in both the police and the justice system in the Turkey. The
dependent variables are coded "0" for respondents who reported "none at all" or "not very
much" confidence and "1" for respondents who reported having "a great deal" or "quite a
lot" of confidence. Thus, these analyses compare people who have a lot of confidence to
those who do not. I started by examining the effects of the demographic variables on
confidence (Model 1), and then added the religiosity measures (Model 2).
For both confidence in the police and confidence in the justice system, Model 1
shows that gender and education level are negatively related to having a lot of confidence
in the police. Men are less likely to have a lot of confidence in the police (odds
ratio=0.70)3 and the justice system (odds ratio=0.74)3. Also, more educated people are
0.84 times less likely to have a lot of confidence in the police and 0.89 times less likely to
have a lot of confidence in the justice system.3
For both confidence in the police and the justice system, Model 2 shows that
beliefs about importance of religion and attending religious services are positively related
to confidence in the police and the justice system. In addition, considering themselves
religious is positively related to confidence in the police.

3

The odds ratio computed by raising e to the power of the logistic coefficient.
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*p<0.05. **p<0.01.

1.85
0.27 ** -1.44 0.59 *
1323
1280
0.068
0.173

Constant
N
R square

**
*

**
**

**

Gender
Age (in years)
Education Level
Importance of Religion
Membership of Rel. Org.
Attending Religious Services
Religious Person
Importance of God
1.52
0.28 **
1315
0.041

-0.67
1273
0.098

0.58

Confidence in the Justice
Model 1
Model 2
b
SE
b
SE
-0.30 0.13 *
-0.58 0.17
0.01 0.01
0.01
0.01
-0.12 0.03 ** -0.07 0.03
--0.25
0.11
---0.27 0.40
--0.14
0.04
--0.25
0.19
--0.07
0.05

Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting Confidence in the Police and the Justice System
Confidence in the Police
Model 1
Model 2
b
SE
b
SE
-0.36 0.13 ** -0.78 0.17
0.00 0.01
0.00 0.01
-0.17 0.03 ** -0.10 0.03
--0.42 0.11
---0.39 0.39
--0.19 0.04
--0.41 0.18
--0.08 0.05

Table 4.8
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**

*
*

**

In sum, the bivariate correlations show that religiosity is positively associated
with Turkish people's beliefs about punishment (i.e., about the importance of severe
punishment as a characteristic of democracy). Regarding the demographic variables,
while age and education are not significant, gender has a weak positive association with
the belief that about severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. In
addition, both religiosity and beliefs about severe punishment relate positively to
opinions about democracy.
In addition, both the bivariate correlations and the regression analyses show that
religiosity is positively related to confidence in the police and the justice system.
Regarding the demographic variables, men and more educated people are less likely have
confidence in police and the courts. While the bivariate correlations show that age is
positively correlated with confidence, this relationship was not significant in the
regression analyses.
Regression analyses show that people who believe God is important and attend
religious services are more likely to think severe punishment is an essential characteristic
of democracy. Also, men are more likely to believe severe punishment is an essential
characteristic of democracy.
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Table 4.9

Summary of the Findings from the U.S. and Turkey

Hypothesis 1: religious people are more
punitive

Supported both in the U.S. and Turkey
(specifically, importance of God)

Hypothesis 2: levels of punitiveness are higher in
Turkey than in the U.S.
Hypothesis 3: religious people tend to have
more confidence in criminal justice institutions
Hypothesis 4: level of confidence in criminal
justice institutions are higher in Turkey than in
the U.S.

Supported
Partially supported in the U.S.
(only correlation analyses
supported)
Supported in Turkey
Partially supported (only
confidence in the justice system)

Comparison between the U.S and Turkey
Table 10 compares beliefs about importance of severe punishment and confidence
in the police and the justice system in the U.S. and Turkey. It also compares levels of
religiosity between the two countries. The results show that Turkish (M = 7.8 on a 10point scale) people are more likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential
characteristic of democracy than are Americans (M = 6.8 on a 10-point scale). The t-test
statistic (t = 10.323) for the difference between two means is statistically significant at
the .01 level. There is a significant difference between the U.S. and Turkey in average
beliefs about severe punishment as an essential characteristic of democracy. Table 10
also shows that Turks' (M = 0.7) and Americans' (M = 0.7) show similar levels of
confidence in the police. The Chi-Square test (x2 = 0.823) shows there is not a significant
difference between the U.S. and Turkey in average confidence in the police. However,
Turks (M = 0.8) are more likely have confidence in the justice system than are Americans
(M = 0.6). There is a significant differences between the U.S. and Turkey in average
confidence in the justice system (x2 = 80.446).
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Regarding the importance of living in a country that is governed democratically,
the average response is higher for Turks (M = 9.1 on a 10-point scale) than for Americans
(M = 8.7 on a 10-point scale). However, Americans (M = 6.4 on a 10-point scale) are
more likely than Turks (M = 5.9 on a 10-point scale) to say their country is being
governed democratically.
Regarding religiosity, Turks are somewhat more likely to think religion and God
are important in their lives. Membership in religious organizations and attendance at
religious services are higher in the U.S. than in Turkey.
Table 4.10

Comparison Between the U.S. and Turkey

Importance of Severe Punishment
Confidence in the Police
Confidence in the Justice
Importance of Democracy
Democraticness in Own Country
Importance of Religion
Membership of Religious Org.
Attending Religious Services
Religious Person
Importance of God
*p<0.05. **p<0.01.

U.S. Sample
(N=1,249)
Mean
6.8
0.7
0.6
8.7
6.4
3.1
0.7
3.9
0.8
8.3
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Turkish
Sample
(N=1,346)
Mean
7.8
0.7
0.8
9.1
5.9
3.6
0.0
3.8
0.8
9.4

t = 10.323 **
x2 = 0.823
x2 = 80.446 **

Table 4.11

Crosstabulation of Confidence in the Police

Confidence in the Police
None at all or not
Quite a lot or
very much
a great deal
Turkey
375
948
U.S.
324
888
*p<0.05. **p<0.01.
Table 4.12

x2
0.823

Crosstabulation of Confidence in the Justice

Confidence in the Justice
None at all or not
Quite a lot or a
very much
great deal
Turkey
329
986
U.S.
505
702
*p<0.05. **p<0.01.
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x2
80.446

**

DISCUSSION
In this chapter, I provide a brief summary of the findings. Next, I will identify
some of the strengths and limitations of the present study, and make some
recommendations for future research on these issues.
I expected to find that people who are more religious are more punitive in their
responses to crime than are non-religious people. For the purpose of this study,
punitiveness referred to people's beliefs about the importance of severe punishment as a
characteristic of democracy. Previous studies have shown that more religious people tend
to be more punitive than less religious people in their response to crime. They are more
likely to support harsh punishments like incarceration and the death penalty (Ellison,
1991; Grasmick et al., 1993; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004; Grasmick and McGill, 1994;
Gelb, 2011). As expected, the current findings support previous studies from both the
U.S. and Turkey. The results showed that religiosity is positively associated with beliefs
about punishment (i.e., about the importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of
democracy). In particular, beliefs about the importance of God increase beliefs about
severe punishment as an essential characteristic of democracy in both the U.S. and
Turkey. Hardisty (2004) explains that because religious people tend to believe people
have the control to choose between right and wrong, they are responsible for their
choices. Therefore, poverty, abuse, addiction, and lack of opportunity do not excuse
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committing a crime. In addition, religious people think those who violate the law must
pay the penalties and need self-discipline, punishment, isolation, and religious
redemption to correct their behavior (Hardisty, 2004).
I hypothesized that Turkish people are more likely to believe that severe
punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy than are Americans. The current
study's finding supports this expectation. This finding may be explained by two ideas.
First, while the U.S. is more diverse in its religious makeup, Turkey is more
homogenous. Religious homogeneity likely represents the shared cultural and political
influence of policies and it affects formal and informal case processing and sentencing
norms. Homogeneous religious communities favor more punitive criminal sanctions and
incarceration (Ulmer et al., 2008). Therefore, Turkish communities may favor more
punitive criminal sanctions than the U.S. Second, if people feel vulnerable and insecure,
rationally or not, they often look for someone or something to blame. Hard economic
times, rapid social change, beliefs about the loss of respect and discipline in society,
concerns about social cohesion, and fear about the social threat lead people to feel more
vulnerable and insecure. These feelings may, in turn, lead to a more punitive-minded
general public (Hardisty, 2004; Tyler and Boeckann, 1997; King and Maruna, 2009).
Compared to the U.S., Turkish people are more likely to feel vulnerable and insecure
because Turkey has an unstable economy (Boratav et al., 1996), politically unstable (e.g.,
three military interventions happened that is military force into the current governance;
Akbaba and Morrison, 2012), and is more likely to be under terrorist attacks (Global
Terrorism Index, 2014). Because people are more likely to desire conformity, social
order, and discipline, they look to legal institutions to punish threats to collective
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security. Concerns about social cohesion and feeling of insecurity may lead Turkish
people to support more severe punishments.
In addition, previous studies claim that fundamentalist and/or conservative
Protestants are more likely support severe punishment than liberal/moderate protestants
(Grasmick et al., 1993; Ellison and Sherkat, 1993). Although the current data do not
separate people as conservative and not conservative, or fundamentalist and not
fundamentalist, it was examined whether there were any differences among religious
affiliation in regard of beliefs about severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy
in the U.S. These analyses included Orthodox, Protestant, Roman Catholic, no religious
affiliation, and other. The findings showed that Protestants are more likely to think that
severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy than are people who have
no religious affiliation.
Regarding demographic characteristics in the U.S., similar to expectations older
and less educated people are more likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential
characteristic of democracy. Reason for these findings may be that older people who are
more vulnerable, may be more fearful and thus more punitive than younger people, who
are less vulnerable people (Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986). Also, more educated
people may have more tolerant to offenders and they are more likely to believe in giving
a second chance to wrongdoers (Applegate et al., 2000; Grasmick et al., 1993; Dowler,
2003). In contrast, age and education level did not significantly affect beliefs about
punishment in Turkey. However, as expected, Turkish men are significantly more likely
than women to believe severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy.
Langwothy and Whitehead (1986) claim that women who are more vulnerable, may be
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more fearful and thus more punitive than men, who are less vulnerable people
(Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986). Also, another reason for this finding may be that
men are less likely women to feel empathy toward criminals (Unnever and Cullen, 2009).
This study also considered how religion relates to feelings about democracy
because the WVS asks about severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy.
Previous studies claim that belonging to religious organizations, being politically active,
and discussing politics with others positively influences people’s attitudes about
democracy. People who are members of a religious organization or are religiously
dedicated, engaged in political and social networks, and hold higher social status, view
democracy very positively (Meyer, Tope, and Price, 2008). Higher levels of religiosity
increase beliefs about the importance of democracy among both Christians and Muslims
(Grundel and Maliepaard, 2012; Meyer et al., 2008; Bratton, 2003; Patterson, 2004). The
current study also supports these claims. It found that opinions about democracy and
religiosity are positively related in both the U.S. and Turkey.
This study also predicted that people who are more religious have more
confidence in the police and the justice system. Wisneski et al. (2009) claimed that
religiosity reflects a generalized willingness to trust authority, regardless of whether the
authority is secular or religious. Belief in God and a generally high level of trust in
religion influence trust in the authorities. Stronger religiosity would be associated with
greater trust in authorities. Previous studies found that level of confidence in legal
authorities is positively related to one's religiosity (Cao, Stack, and Sun, 1998; Garza,
Rossi, and Zaclicever, 2009; Guiso et al., 2003). The current study was found that
confidence in the police and the justice system are positively related to beliefs about
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importance of religion and attending religious services in Turkey, but a similar
relationship was not found in the United States.
In addition, it was expected to find that level of confidence in criminal justice
institutions are higher in Turkey than in the U.S. Results confirmed this expectation that
Turks are more likely have confidence in the justice system than are Americans. This
difference may be because in Turkey less people involved in the criminal justice system
as a victim or an offender than are Americans (Ghandoosh, 2014), therefore Turkish
people may less likely to experience efficacy of the courts. However, confidence in the
police is not found significantly different.
The effects of demographic characteristics on confidence in the police and the
justice system differ between the U.S. and Turkey. In the U.S., older people have more
confidence in the police and more educated people have more confidence in the police
and the justice system, perhaps because they are more likely to see criminal justice
institutions as maintaining safety and order (Jesilow et al., 1995). Also, women and less
educated people have more confidence in the police and the justice system in Turkey.
Because men and more educated people are more critical of the criminal justice system,
they may have less confidence (Thompson and Lee, 2004). This finding support Cao and
Zhao (2005)'s claim about education makes people value freedom more, and thus,
decreases one's confidence in the police because the police is one of the government's
long arms and represents the oppressive part of a democratic government.
Limitations of the study
Many studies examining the relationships among beliefs about punishment, levels
of confidence in criminal justice institutions, and religiosity have been conducted in
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Europe and the United States. To examine these relationships in Turkey and to compare
them to the U.S. is unique. Previous studies compared to the U.S. and other industrialized
countries and they found that the U.S. is more punitive (Kugler et al., 2013; Wilson and
Petersilia, 2010). The current study contribute to the literature that Turks are more likely
believe the importance of severe punishment even though Turkey has less crime rate than
the U.S. Moreover, Turkey should not be ignored in the criminological literature because
it is a bridge nation culturally, economically, geographically, and politically. There are,
however, several limitations to this study. I used Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the World
Values Survey (WVS) for the current study. Although Wave 6 is now available, it was
not used because there were no questions about public perception about punishment. A
second limitation is that this study only used one question to measure public beliefs about
punishment.
Another potential limitation is the age of data because after seven years public
opinion may show different results because after 2008 (the year of Wave 5) several
important issues happened that may affect public perception about punishment and
confidence in legal authorities. As I mentioned before Gezi Park Protests, suicide bomb
attacks (Amnesty International, 2013) may decrease confidence in legal authorities and
may be seen as a social threat and increase public belief about importance of severe
punishment.
Because the Turkish data was collected in an urban in the west of Turkey
(Istanbul), results may differ across cities and regions of the country. The location where
the sample was taken is not in a conservative city. This may change level of religiosity
and public beliefs about punishment and confidence in the police and the justice system.
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Directions for future research
I believe the measurement of religiosity was effective in the current study,
because it measured several reliable questions, but the effect of being a fundamentalist or
not should be included in future studies. It may help to completely understand whether
fundamentalism affects correctional practices and attitudes. Future studies should also
examine the effects of Islamic fundamentalism.
Additionally, there are not enough studies that examine the relationship between
political affiliation and both public perception about punishment and confidence in legal
authorities. Several studies link religiosity and voting for conservative political parties
(LaMothe, 2012). Therefore, future studies should also examine the effects of being
politically conservative on punitiveness and confidence in legal institutions.
As a conclusion, religiosity affects public attitudes about the importance of severe
punishments (as a characteristic of democracy) and Turkish people are more likely to
think punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy than Americans. Although
the relationship between religiosity and confidence in the police and the justice system
was found in Turkey, it was not found in the U.S. In addition, it was found that
confidence in the justice system is higher in Turkey than in the U.S.
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